Transnational Associations

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Associations transnationales

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Transnational Associations is a unique bilingual journal whose aim is to deal with major current problems within the perspective of international nongovernmental organizations. It is intended to provide a forum for authoritative information and independent reflection on the increasing role played by these organizations in the international system, and on its philosophical, political, economic or cultural implications.

The approach is intrinsically interdisciplinary, and calls for both specialist expertise and practitioner experience in transnational association matters. *Transnational Associations* provides background information about the actions and achievements of international associations, and insight into their interrelations with intergovernmental organizations. It covers a wide range of topics, among which social organization, humanitarian law, scientific cooperation, language and culture, economic development, to cite just a few.

The programme of the review, in accordance with the principles of the UIA, clarifies general awareness concerning the association phenomenon within the framework of international relations and, in particular, informs associations about aspects of the problems which they tend to share or which are of commun interest to them. Contributors to the journal review include association officers, research workers and specialists of association questions who engage only themselves.

Founded in Brussels in 1907 as the Central Office of International Associations, the UIA became a federation under the present name in 1910 at the 1st World Congress of International Associations. Activities were closely associated with the Institut international de bibliographie, which later became the International Federation for Documentation. Its work contributed to the creation of the League of Nations and the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (the predecessor of UNESCO). During the 1920s. the UIA created an International University, the first of its kind.

The UIA has consultative relations with UNESCO, UN/ECOSOC, and ILO. It collaborates with FAO, the Council of Europe, UNITAR, and the Commonwealth Science Council.

Associations transnationales *est la seule revue traitant des grands problèmes contemporains dans la perspective des organisations internationales non gouvernementales. Elle se propose d'apporter des éléments d'information provenant des sources les plus autorisées, propres à susciter une réflexion indépendante sur l'affirmation du rôle joué par ces acteurs dans le système international et sur les aspects philosophiques, politiques, sociaux et culturels de cette évolution.*

La visée adoptée est essentiellement interdisciplinaire et fait appel au savoir comme à la pratique des spécialistes du champ d'action des associations transnationales. Les documents, articles et études publiés par Associations transnationales *traitent également des liens établis entre celles-ci et les organisations intergouvemementales. Les domaines couverts s'étendent aux problèmes de société, au droit humanitaire, à la coopération scientifique, aux questions linguistiques et culturelles, au développement économique ou à tout phénomène affectant la vie de ces associations.*

Le programme de la revue, conformément aux buts de l'UAI, vise à éclairer l'opinion sur la signification de la dimension associative des relations internationales, notamment en informant les associations au sujet des questions qui relèvent de leurs domaines ou affectent leurs intérêts communs. Les textes des auteurs publiés par la revue (dirigeants d'associations, chercheurs et spécialistes des questions associatives) n'engagent que leur opinion.

L'UAI a été créée officiellement en 1910 à Bruxelles au cours du premier congrès mondial des associations internationales. Ses fondateurs, le Sénateur Henri La Fontaine, prix Nobel de la Paix 1913 et Paul Otlet, Secrétaire général de l'Institut international de bibliographie, avaient mis sur pied en 1907 l'«Office central des institutions internationales» auquel l'UAI succéda sous la forme de fédération. En 1914, elle regroupait 230 organisations, soit un peu plus de la moitié de celles qui existaient à l'époque. L'UAI devait incarner, dans l'esprit de ses fondateurs, les aspirations internationalistes et les idéaux de paix qui animaient ces associations et qui allaient aboutir en 1920 à la création de la Société des Nations.

L'UAI a obtenu le statut consultatif auprès ***de l'ECOSOC, de l'UNESCO et de l'OIT.*** *Elle collabore avec l'UNITAR, la FAO et le Conseil de l'Europe. Elle entretient des relations générales et ponctuelles avec les* ***organisations*** *régionales.*

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Toward a normative politics of global transformation: synthetizing alternative perspectives

*by Ignatius Swart **

Voices for alternatives and the imperative for global coalition and transformation

> To me, the real answer to the present turbulence is the only civilised alternative to both the globalizing and ethnic izing trends, namely a worldwide federal democratic movement, both political and social, which alone is capable of responding to the demands for the self-determination of regions and ethnic groups as well as the struggles for equity and justice. Only such a movement can respond to the genuine need of transcending national boundaries and experimenting wich various supranational formations that can deal with new socioeconomic needs, new ideas of organizing human collectivities, and the growth of new identities (Rajni Kothari 1993: 128)

We live in a world at present which calls for radical alternatives and transformation. At least, this is the point of view taken by a noticeable group of intellectuals today theorising about alternatives not only in development, but also in many other fields. Indeed, it is a point of view urged by normative conviction, by cultural sensitivity, by ecological concern, by aesthetic valuation and by a deep awareness that gross injustices are being done to the majority of the world's people who are not receiving their fair share in the current world system and societal arrangement. At deepest and in the more religio-philosophical sense, it is a point of view characterised by a discontent with the "good life" of Western society itself, a fundamental questioning of the dominant value-system and a reconsideration of the relation between *having* and *being* that determines the latter system (see Goulet 1995: ix).

Hence, we may furthermore say, the above-mentioned urge for transformation and alternatives on an intellectual level is today also confirmed by the many new social movements which have asserted themselves in recent times. To many, in fact, these movements, grassroots, national and transnational, in the North and in the South, have come to denote the decisive subjects to bring about the positive change and transformation which are increasingly desired (see e.g. Sakamoto 1995: 139-143; Falk 1987; Rahnema 1993: 169-172; also Shaw 1994: 651).

Whilst the latter social movements, as well as the above-mentioned alternative intellectual movement, have all shown a profound discontentment with predominant statist approaches to regulate social change, affirming the increasing obsolescence of exclusive statist views, someone like Lester Ruiz, coming from the same (progressive) intellectual environment, have pointed out the significance of "Progressive and leftist" nationalist and popular political formations from the South that have started to mobilise across nation-state boundaries in the post-Cold War era. According to Ruiz three major gatherings by leftist and progressive parties, organizations and fronts from Latin America and the Caribbean in Sao Paolo in 1990, Mexico City in 1991, and Managua in 1992 denoted the emergence of a new "major leftist political formation that underscores the profound transformations that are occurring in leftist theory and practice in the South" (Ruiz 1994: 250). Hence the declared goal of the meeting in Managua, the III Encuentro Continental de Resistencia Indigena, Negra y Popular, representing twenty-six countries, "to generate a broad, pluralistic, multi-ethnic and democratic movement to work for a new international economic, social, political, and environmental order" (Ruiz. *ibid).*

For Ruiz, finally, the articulative practices of the political formations noted above signalled "a clear, even fierce, affirmation of the peoples of the South as the subjects of their own history"; "an uncompromising commitment to a nationalist, popular, and socialist vision of the future of the peoples of the South, and in contrast, a clear repudiation of the present global system oriented around multi-national capitalism and its logic" (Ruiz 1994: 251-252). Hence our point of reservation that Luiz is perhaps underestimating somewhat, through his omittance of such fact, the appeal of global capitalism and Western notions of development (modernisation) to the South and Third World itself (see Lee 1994: 2-3, 45; Ulrich 1993: 284), an appeal which is forcefully and effectively undermining leftists and socialist aspirations, values

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and ideologies in those societies (a good case in point which illustrates this fact is for instance the succumbing of socialist forces and ideals in the new South Africa to global capitalism). Nevertheless, notwithstanding this reservation, we, together with Ruiz, take the above-mentioned political stirrings in the South as an important attempt by the counterpoint (to Western capitalism) to reassert and mobilize itself to work for an alternative system of societal arrangement and regulation by and large. Fundamentally, however, in the context of the discussion in this paper, is our point of view that these political formations from the South (as for instance identified by Ruiz) would need to become part of a larger global initiative of progressive actors or subjects to bring about the transformations which are envisioned.

But it is also from another corner that the voice for alternatives (in the plural!) is being raised in no uncertain manner. This is the protest by contemporary fundamentalisms and ethnic uprisings against the homogenising and excluding trends of current globalisation. Manipulated by Western forces and ideology to be viewed only in extremely negative light these upsurges, however, also signify the deep feelings of frustration by non-Western societies and peoples against the political, economic and cultural imperialisms of contemporary globalisrn - in which the Northern economic and political powers and the minority elite in the South have in fact formed a coalition against the majority of poor and deprived particularly from the South. As the following more sensitive, non-western perspective of current ethnic uprisings in the South by Rajni Kothari also declares: «{Ethnicity} is a response to the North within the South. To the homogenising thrusts of capitalism, the nation-state and technology. To regimes that are engaged in integrating diverse social formations into a global marketplace... Ethnicity represents a revolt against this. It is an affirmation of the hitherto subdued and excluded, reflecting deep stirrings of consciousness as well as emerging capacities of challenging hegemonies, engaging in a recovery of both civic and sacred spaces that are sought to be overtaken in the ruthless march of modern economies, modern statehood and modern technology. And in many instances it is an affirmation of the local, the regional and the 'ethnic' against the internal colonisation that has often accompanied the more pervasive and corrosive forms of the nationalism of the nation-state... The new expressions of ethnicity are a challenge to both these homogenising thrusts - of the nation-state and world order (Kothari 1988: 194)».

Indeed, it is in the contemporary uprisings of political Islam that the protest against current globalisation, as described above, is becoming particularly evident. Hence the conclusion that the alternatives to the current world system or order which are to be constructed will, fundamentally, have to accommodate the aspirations of the latter grouping for self-expression and better livelihood, but also of the many other non-Western groupings of the world. It is with regard to such conclusion that someone like Mohammed Sid-Ahmed's statement that there can be no world peace without the inclusion of Islam in the shaping of contemporary (or rather future!) global civilisation must be taken very seriously. Identifying the present Arab-Israeli dispute as a focal point of Islamic cultural aspiration Sid-Ahmed concludes: «The way in which the Arab-Israeli dispute is tackled will be decisive in determining the outcome of the confrontation with Islam in the future. If the determining factor in concluding an Arab-Israeli peace is to avert what the West perceives as the growing danger of political Islam, there will be no peace. In fact, the confrontation with political Islam will deepen. The time has come to put an end to this confrontation by recognising Islam as one of the main tributaries flowing into the mainstream of contemporary global civilisation. It is only by restoring its legitimate place in the commonwealth of contemporary culture that Islam will shed its political character in a confrontation imposed on it by the West (Sid-Ahmed 1994:219)» -

Identifying all the above subjects as actors calling for, and in increasing instances demanding for, alternatives to the current world order we may furthermore note that there now appears to be a growing consensus emerging, especially by theorists of alternatives, that

a global coalition of progressive forces and actors is required to bring about an alternative world society (pertaining to social arrangement and structure). Recognized by theorists of an alternative development that all the grassroots initiatives for transformation, being dispersed and to a large extent a-political in character, have remained rather insufficient to enforce the macro changes which are required to bring about a more just and sustainable world (Sheth 1987: 165-169; see also Kothari 1995: 128), the latter perspective even coupled with such pessimistic views that we are in fact facing a world in which there will be little scone for alternatives (Kothari 1994), the perspective which is now emerging is that of a macro theory of transformative political action to be constructed and implemented. As D. L. Sheth (1987: 169) has put it, a theory 'which is based on the values and practice of democracy and which has synthesising potentials for integrating the perspectives and actions of various issue-based movements in a larger framework of transformation'.

In short, then, the alternative strategy and agenda which is called for and which is now emerging (at least in theory) is fundamentally *political* in kind and *global* in scope. Crucial furthermore, it is a strategy that is normative in kind, determined by certain universal values. For its impact it calls upon a new project of global *solidarity* (see Waterman, forthcoming) which may bring together all progressive parties coming from national and global civil society, from nation states, and from the regional and transnational political arenas. Pertinent, furthermore, is this strategy and agenda's scope for new global institutional arrangements, which necessarily imply the radical *democratisation* of existing global institutions to address issues of security, environment and development that are necessarily global in scope, and also for structural changes on a global scale to bring in place a new *pluralistic* world order of far greater political, economic and social (cultural) equality and fairness (warranting maximum diversity and self-realization) than the one at present.

Thus, it is a strategy and agenda which have particular processes, generated by the coalition of particular actors or subjects, as well as particular ends in view. What we are speaking of here, then, are in particular those perspectives of processes and ends that are directly associated with what is known as the *World Order Models Project* (WOMP) and, consequently, also the journal *Alternatives*, which has been a direct outcome of the latter project and in which the perspectives of the WOMP has been put forward. Finding particularly in the latter circle of the WOMP and Alternatives our framework and contents of perspective we, however, want to make it clear that we, in principle, do not want to restrict ourselves to this circle. For this reason we also integrate, however to a limited extent in this paper, perspectives which have been put forward in publications outside *Alternatives*, perspectives that we regard to provide a significant complement to the framework and contents put forward in the latter journal.

What we are thus aiming at in the rest of this paper is to provide some sort of a synthesis of the unfolding perspectives and the agenda put forward by a particular group of theorists (with reference to the previous paragraph) who have in view a *global* transformation of the present world order or system. Necessary to say further that these theorists are building there perspectives on the practices of certain new actors in the arena of politics and development and, furthermore, are also directly associated with what have come to be known as *alternative development* theory and practice. However, these perspectives go beyond the latter mentioned actors and beyond the notion of development: fundamentally and more, they comprise a particular *systemic* and *structural* component which must be regarded as indispensable to more *permanent* and *long term* solutions to the current deprivation of the majority of the world's people and their abstention through the current structures by and large from self-actualization; to this must crucially be added, more permanent and sustainable solutions to the present ecological deterioration and destruction brought about by current socio-economic practices and arrangements. To further explain this systemic and structural perspective - or vision! - we may well turn to the exposition of perspective set out by Rajni Kothari in the very first

edition *of Alternatives.* He wrote: «The concept of alternatives, then, is not to be limited just to development policies; it should entail visions about society and polity, and it should do this in the context of the evolution of the human community as a whole. When available models are found wanting and a new alternative is called forth, this applies not just to social and economic arrangements within a given society, but to the ordering of the world as a whole - Alternatives is a conception not just in the theory of development. It entails a model of and a perspective for world order and the transformations entailed for such a world order. It is an exercise in values and their realisation at various levels of reality, always taking account of cultural diversities but also of the unities that inform these diversities. It is not just a different kind of model for China or India or Tanzania (or Brazil) that one is seeking out though no doubt these and other models provides a very large scope for learning and criticism and action. One is also concerned about the making of a different kind of world conceived as a set of interrelationships. Without seeking to alter these interrelationships the effort to alter individual societies is not likely to go very far. This is the great change that has taken place in human affairs, the global setting in which they have to be conducted. (Kothari 1915: S)».

Relating ourselves directly to the framework and contents of the WOMP, and consequently the ideas expressed in the journal *Alternatives,* we are also likewise exposed to criticisms of being unrealistic and opportunistic, of presenting a blueprint, and of being Utopian. On the issue of utopianism, first of all, a note. In this regard we find much comfort in Björn Hettne's reply to the same point of utopianism and alternatives when he states that the current mainstream model of society and development is to his mind also Utopian because of its long-term unviability. For Hettne, furthermore, this unviability is due more to inherent contradictions of the mainstream model (of Western modernity) itself than to the lack of political support for it. To the contrary alternative models (which are now proposed) are in fact more viable in ecological and social terms, but here the accusation for utopianism rests precisely, and rather, on the lack of political backing (Hettne 1995: 160); we may add to Hettne, on the lack of *moral* conviction - as the title of this paper suggests, we do not make a separation between morality (values, norms) and politics. Hence our conclusion together with Hettne that the alternative view (or views) may well become more relevant as the crisis deepens. 'What seemed Utopian in the 1970s may become necessary as we move towards the year 2000.' (Hettne 1995: 161)

In further defence of our adherence to the WOMP perspective we express our comfort with it exactly because it does not want to provide a blueprint. Over against any suggestions of a blueprint its very strength could be seen as lying in the fact that it has in scope the *social totality* of the human and social reality (see Ruiz 1994: 252) without providing a blueprint. As such it envisions systemic and structural change to the extent that would in fact make possible the ideals of cultural plurality and diversity to its full blossoming whilst not forsaking some sort of interrelationship, cooperation and mutual enriching between the diverse societies. Fundamentally, it envisions institutional change to support and serve *all* these different societies in an equally fait manner. But having in view a certain global framework of transformed structural and institutional arrangement the WOMP perspective significantly sets itself clear *limitations* of perspective. Indeed, this recognition seems to take a central place in the current thinking of the WOMP. Following for instance from one of the recent writings by Lester Ruiz on WOMP perspective new ideas and metaphors of *myth* and myth-making, and of *horizon* are presently determining the project's conception, hence making place for yet nonconceptualizable and unimaginable spaces and identities to be generated and constructed by the subjects of those spaces themselves (see Ruiz 1994: 254-259). As Ruiz furthermore describes the dialectic or creative tension between fixed and nonconceptualizable imaginaries that are determining WOMP perspective based on the affirmation *of plurality:* «This is not to suggest the undesirability of the idea of a peace and world order studies perspective or even a political project to constitute a

global polity. In fact, I will suggest later that the latter may very well be necessary to the construction of a radical imaginary... The affirmation of plurality, or difference, or the multiplicity of subjects and subject positions implies a fundamental challenge to some of the preferred trajectories or favourite strategies of peace and world order practices. In fact, this affirmation has a two-fold significance: on the one hand, plurality presupposes the recognition of different canters of power, thereby challenging those centralising logics implicit in many of modernity's projects. Such centers function as dislocatory practices, putting in question institutional logics that are hegemonic; and underscoring the historical and contingent character of these logics and practices. On the other hand, plurality points to different constructions of community and identity, alternative forms of knowledge and being, and diverse political strategies - all of which underscore not only the impossibility of a fixed positivity but of genuinely other spaces for the construction of transformative cultural practices. Precisely because of this multiplicity of subjects and subject positions, which function as dislocatory practices, we understand that our frameworks and perspectives - indeed our preferred worlds and transition strategies - are radically contingent, precarious, historical. We are brought face to face with our end, with our limits. (Ruiz 1994 254-255)».

Consequently, we may conclude, it is within the latter conceptual framework - and socio-political arrangement - that one may anticipate the full blossoming of different alternatives coming in particular from the many peripheries of world society. It is within such a framework and arrangement that we can perceive the possibilities of an African alternative (see Nabudere 1994: 170), an Islamic-Arab alternative (see Sid-Ahmed 1994: 219), hence, of many other indigenous alternatives around the world - however, which do not imply extreme autarky or delinking but, to the contrary, a situation in which radically democratized global institutions will serve the many local and regional alternatives (see Shiva 1993: 154-156) for them to come to full self-realization and self-expression.

On a final note regarding our adherence to the WOMP perspective we relate this project also directly to that particular practice of an alternative development strategy which has come to be known as Participatory Action-Research (PAR) - in particular as put forward by the radical exponents of such practice (e.g. Fais Borda 19S8; Rahnema 1993; Rahman 1993). Consequently, we see the WOMP as the creative response to Orlando Fals Bordas recognition of a 'healthy compulsion to modify the current vision and mission of Participatory Action-Research as set in a wider historical perspective and to look beyond it'; furthermore, the WOMP as the next step in 'a progressive evolution [of PAR] toward overall, structural transformation of society and culture; a process that requires ever renewed commitment; an ethical stand, self-critique, and persistence at all levels' (Fals Borda 1992: 18). Indeed, we conclude, there is a direct correlation between the values, principles and goals determining radical PAR practices and that which determine the WOMP.

A value-driven political process and the quest for a global values construct

In WOMP, as in radical alternative development thinking, values and ethics have shifted to the forefront of discourse. Fundamentally, in this discourse politics, structures and values/ethics have converged in the framework for understanding and action. As Richard Falk has significantly described the essence of the WOMP, it 'is a *norm-driven, values-guided expression* of *anthropolitics* (italics added), seeking to fulfil human potentialities, but contextually, that is, acknowledging and celebrating difference and resisting totalizing modes of thought, organization, and technological capability' (Falk 1994: 146).

For Falk, furthermore, it is the latter normative character of the WOMP which fundamentally differentiates it from the hegemonic and totalizing nature of post-Cold War geopol-

itics, also coined as the 'new world order'. Whereas the WOMP discourse cannot escape a certain descriptive and predictive element necessarily pertaining to the social totality and the aggregate common good of humanity as a whole (political, economic, social and cultural), thus implying a focus on some form of global (humane) governance pertaining to socio-economic and socio-political arrangement and regulation on behalf of the well-being of all humanity, it remains an essence a *normative* project and not a hegemonic one (in the totalizing sense). Normative in the sense that it has in view a '(n)ew world order... to be created by a combination of social-forces acting effectively and on behalf of such world order values as nonviolence, economic and social justice, human rights and democracy, and environmental quality'; normative, furthermore, in the sense that it is informed and inspired by a moral 'desire to improve the human condition by direct political action, deploying means that reject violence, respect truth, and rest their confidence upon democracy as both process and outcome' (Falk, ibid.). To add, crucial to emphasise again that the non-hegemonic nature of the project is to be guaranteed through the principle of *diversity* which constantly has to inform and determine the articulation of the specified values into concrete political action and systemic transformation.

Having specified the value-driven, normative contents or nature of the political processes determining the WOMP the question naturally arises about the *actors* relied upon to direct such a normative politics and also about the possibility of a true global reach of such politics and values - specified in the sub-title above as the quest for a global value construct. With regard to such questions we may first of all point to a recent article by writers Coate, Alger and Lipschutz who have pur forward a rather favourable picture of an ongoing process towards a new global values construct. According to these authors new nations, states and movements, in the context of UN fora and elsewhere, have gained increasing access to an ongoing dialogue on global values in global governance, thereby shaping definitions of values that have acquired growing global relevance and legitimacy. According to them, furthermore, it is now possible to summarise this dialogue in terms of four widely accepted global values: *peace* (non-violence), *development* (economic well-being), *human rights*, and *ecological balance* (Coate, Alger and Lipschutz 1996: 102-103). [1]

In recent years, the above-mentioned authors proceed, the latter four values have in fact been integrated into what is, by now, largely a single dialogue. Substantiating their argument these authors firstly point to the fact that it is now increasingly accepted by peace movements that the full meaning of peace does not only pertain to the notion of non-violence, but also to development, human rights and ecological balance. At the same time, they argue, it is increasingly accepted that human rights must include not only civil or political rights but also economic, social and cultural rights, and environmental justice. But significantly, furthermote, also the notion of 'development' has gone through a continual process of redefinition, from Western economie growth models to self-reliance of Third Word states, to fulfilling the basic needs of people, to people deciding for themselves what their basic needs are (i.e. local self-reliance). A fourth significant development towards a single values construct, Coate et al. indicates, have also been the integration of 'ecological balance' into a single dialogue. As a consequence of ongoing dialogue about its meaning, they argue, ecological balance has subsumed the dimensions of development, human rights, and peace. As significant as the latter ecological determination, Coate et al. finally conclude, is the tendency by many involved in the present effort to define global values to use a broadly defined notion of peace as a paramount global value that is inclusive of all the above-mentioned four value dimensions (Coate, Alger and Lipschutz 1996: 102-103).

Certainly, Coate, Alger and Lipschutz's claim of a single, integrated values construct currently in process should not be dismissed out of hand and in fact calls for an optimistic spirit. But we cannot neglect that there remains an undissolved tension between such optimistic points of view and those more pessimistic ones pointing to increasing processes

(1) It would be pertinent to mention here that these are also four central value concepts determining the WOMP.

of 'global apartheid' (Mazrui 1994; Köhler 1995), to continuing denials of human rights (particularly with regard to women's issues but also otherwise) (see e.g. Mogwe 1994: 189), and to the subtle cooptation of 'the language of resistance' by mainstream forces. With regard to the latter Vandana Shiva, in her contribution to a series of articles emanating from a WOMP workshop held in Zimbabwe in 1993, argued that institutions such as the World Bank and IMF "took over the language of underdevelopment and poverty, removed their history, and made them the reason for a new bondage based on development financing and debt burdens". Situating her argument in the context of North-South bilateral interactions, Shiva furthermore pointed out that by treating biodiversity as a global resource, the World Bank has now emerged as a protector of biodiversity; instead, according to Shiva, it has rather become a case wherein the North succeeds in gaining access to the South's biodiversity as globalisation becomes a political means to ensure an erosion of the South's rights to its own biodiversity (Shiva 1994: 19S; also quoted by Kreml and Kegley 1996: 128).

Putting authors like Coate, Alger and Lipschutz's exposition of global values construction in further relative perspective, mention should also be made of the growing group of critical theorists from the field of international political economy (IPE), but also critical globalisation theorists from other fields. As Anthony Giddens for instance, belonging to the latter group, has concluded on the globalizing trends of contemporary social life in his *Sociology:* '"...the world global system is riven with inequalities... One of the most worrying features of world society today is that increasing globalisation is not matched either by political integration or by the reduction of international inequalities of wealth and power (Giddens 1989: 547). Against the background of such conclusion by Giddens we may subsequently also turn to the conclusion of someone like Robert Cox, belonging to the former group of IPE theorists. Understanding the problem of change as the problem of a particular values construct that is dominating in almost absolute terms Cox states: «It is often said that although United States economic power in the world has experienced a relative decline, the American way of life has never been a more powerful model. An American-derived 'business civilisation', to use Susan Strange's term, characterises the globalizing elites; and American pop culture has projected an image of the good lift that is a universal object of emulation - a universalized model of consumption. This constitutes a serious obstacle to the rethinking of social practices so as to be more compatible with the biosphere. (Cox 1995: 43)».

Thus, problematizing again the prospects of a (new and alternative) global values construct as the fundamental determinator for positive (global) change, without totally neglecting the daims that such a process may in fact have come into momentum, we conclude that such problematization confirms the indispensable need for a more effective and deliberate coalition of progressive, alternative actors or forces to push forward the true global reach, and consequent application, of such a values construct. Necessarily to stress again that such coalescent action calls for an overt value-driven *macro politics.* In WOMP perspective, consequently, this recognition places special hope on the transformative potential of the new social movements. Drawing also on the perspective of Raymond Williams of a mobilising process towards transformation which may be evident today Richard Falk observes that we are envisioning a process in which the new social movements are in fact "losing some of their particularity by expressing a certain overall commitment to the future that draws on common elements" (Falk 1987: 189). But, at the same, it is also significant that Falk, as one of the main spokespersons of the WOMP, acknowledges that social movements can, and are only one important source of positive (global) transformation enforced by a particularly enlightened values construct. For Falk, in particular, other sources include "cultural and technological activities; crisis, accidents, and education; "silent revolutions" in life style and ambitions; enlightened behaviour by governments that solve problems and provide models; cultural artifacts in the form of music, painting, literature; the transnationalizing character of

international institutions and professional associations" (Falk 1987: 178).

However, whilst Falk's perspective positively pertains to sources and actors on the micro and macro levels we retain our standpoint that this perspective, no matter how hopeful, still lacks in a theory and praxis of coherent normative political action. It is in this sense that we find William Kreml and Charles Kegley's (1996) suggestion in the most recent issue of Alternatives of a "global political party", which would consist of the many issue-specific oppositional groups and democratic political parties and organizations existing in the world today, to be provocative and to leave much food for thought for possible constructive opposition on the global level. Whilst these two writers have left problems of institutionalization, locality and operation, and the relationship of such a party to a transformed (!) United Nations, for instance, unanswered it is certainly an idea that calls for further reflection and exploration (see further our final subheading below). Furthermore, it is in the same issue of *Alternatives* that we find the collective perspective of writers Coate, Alger and Lipschutz (1996), already referred to above, of the need for a far-reaching integration of the institutions and actors of civil society in the organization and operation of a (transformed!) United Nations also of crucial relevance. Indeed, we conclude, these two publications, by Kreml and Kegley, and by Coate et al., mark important contributions to the perspective of a coherent normative political activity that is needed for a far-reaching global transformation.

Finally, a discussion on global values cannot neglect the question about the role of religious traditions and institutions in promoting the global values construct envisioned in this discussion. This is indeed an extensive topic which we do not intent to explore here in depth but for a few notations. Within the context of this paper we restrict ourselves to perspectives from the circle of the WOMP and Alternatives, which have been rather and predominantly in favour of religion - at least a certain expression of religion. Significant, then, is for instance Robert Johansen's evaluation that the participants in WOMP would need to give more attention to the role of religious traditions in resisting and in promoting the implementation of particular values. He continues: «Religious traditions possess enormous assets - material, organizational, educational, and spiritual - which can be employed for good or ill in shaping the future world order...Religious traditions are value based, as is ROMP. Religious traditions at their best extol the value of human life and justice...The major religious traditions preach against viewing the state as the highest authority, as does the Project. At their best they stand above or against national parochialism; in this posture they parallel the transnational emphasis of the Project. Religious leaders are often experienced in calling for major attitudinal change, which the..Project also seeks. Both attempt to develop support for doing what is "good", even when the political effectiveness of such actions is not immediately evident. (Johansen 1994: 158-59)».

In a similar positive appraisal Richard Falk stated that the efforts by social movements to reshape the cultural ground of politics have not only set new challenges and opportunities for churches to join in the process of resistance and renewal, but that churches and clergy have throughout the 1980s in fact also provided resources, facilities, and crucial encouragement to the social movements themselves. For Falk, furthermore, "a religious element is [also] congenial with the anti-materialist, anti-secular character of the new movements, as well as with their universalistic sense of human identity" (Falk 1987: 185) Pointing in a later article to the role of the churches in democratic and political struggles in, amongst others, Nicaragua, El Salvador, South Africa, South Korea and the Philippines, Falk concluded that a Christian presence has in fact emerged "at the centre of radical opposition politics" in many contexts of the Third World. But, Falk proceeds, it is not only in the Third World that a constructive pattern of religion and political interpénétration has occurred. He subsequently points to the case of the Solidarity Movement in Poland but also to a less focused, "yet... definite reassertion of religious presence on many political battlefields" in Western Europe and the United States (Falk 1988: 383 - 85).

Returning again to William Kreml and Charles Kegley's idea of a global political party we may subsequently also note these writers' inclusion of the World Council of Churches (WCC) as one of the "issue-specific oppositional groups" to join in such a party (Kreml and Kegley 1996: 133). As an additional note which could be regarded as a positive response to such idea of collectivity again we may point to the recognition within the WCC itself that in order for the churches (collectively speaking) to participate meaningfully in a world-wide democratic countermovement it would be necessary to build alliances not only within their own ranks, but also with the other democratic institutions of international civil society (Raiser 1994: 42-44; see also Batista 1994: 19-20; Ichiyo 1994: 30-37).

Finally, however, a recognition of the (potential) significant contribution of religion or rather religious traditions in the plural to a global values construct, which again is fundamentally integrated with coherent global political action, cannot be concluded without stating more pertinently what the nature of such religion should be and what it should not be. To again point to some of the perspectives corning from the circle *of Alternatives* and the WOMP. In the words of Richard Falk, fundamentalisms are obviously excluded, hence "those religiously-oriented initiatives that rely on violence, seek to transform the state into a theocracy, and fail to incorporate the whole of humanity into their professed imaginary of salvation" (Falk 1987: 185). Adhering to such all-inclusive incorporation it thus pertains to an anti-imperialist and non-expansionist religious attitude and practice which in the words of Ashis Handy evolves "the recovery of religious tolerance" that would sustain "diversities and co-existence in the matter of faith"; which, accordingly, points to a rediscovering of the non-Western meaning of "secularism" of "equal respect for all religions", implying a "space for a continuous dialogue among religious traditions and between the religious and the secular - that, in the ultimate analysis, each major faith... includes within it an in-house version of the other faiths both as an internal criticism and as a reminder of the diversity of the theory of transcendence" (Nancy 1988: 180-81).

In conclusion we may well point to Lester Ruiz's notion of theology as a critical theory and practice of *transformation* for our understanding of religion in the positive. Making a fundamental distinction between religion *per se* and theology, the latter denoting *critical reflection* on the religious and human totality (we would like to add, denoting the critical discursive practice which has to inform and shape religious practice and consciousness), Ruiz's positive conception relating to religion pertains to a critical theological discourse which "is at once public, critical, and transformative"; hence, which rejects the uncritical identification of theological and political discourse, whilst at the same time "celebrates their inextricable relatedness". As such, then, Ruiz aspires to a religious or rather theological practice expressing itself as a "politics of transformation" which, ultimately, is directed towards "the creation and nurture of "fundamentally new and better relationships", that is, relationships between human beings, between humanity and nature, and between the human and the sacred (Ruiz 1988:156-57).

A politics of reconstructive postmodernism

In the discussion above the concepts of diversity, pluralism, and multiple identity as determinants of WOMP perspective have already been noticeably stressed. Simultaneously the notion of coalition and coherent strategy has also been particularly emphasised. Mindful of the fact not to merely repeat what has already been stated it, however, appears necessary from the point of view of WOMP perspective to qualify in some further detail the above dual notion of pluralism and universalise of unity (as informing the strategic and conceptual framework of the WOMP and out understanding of a normative politics of global transformation) under the separate heading *of postmodernism*.

Following from the writing of someone like Richard Falk we may observe that the politics and vision guiding the WOMP are funda-

mentally informed and qualified by postmodern theory and ideology. But as Falk has further pointed out, following David Griffin, it is a postmodernism which is *reconstructive* in kind. In this sense it refutes the statist, rationalist and materialist orientation of modernism. At the same time, however, WOMP perspective postulates not to be dogmatically postmodern in tone or substance and, in fact, still wants to draw upon the achievements of modernity in relation to political order, rationality and material enhancement of life for its goals of reconstruction. It (WOMP) thus follows a strategy which seeks and perceive the necessity to preserve elements of modernity to the extent possible, while being concerned at the same time "about the commodification of the human spirit (the consumerist ethos) and the overall constraints associated with sustainability and ecological well-being" (Falk 1994: 146-147).

Rejecting the totalitarian claim and considerable destructive element of modernism it may thus be stated that WOMP strategy seeks solutions through the multiplicity of existing and new subjects or actors representing multiple forms of insight, knowledge and culture coming from a multiplicity of diverse contexts (see again our quotation of Ruiz on p. 6). This may be seen as one side of the reconstructive postmodernism which WOMP strategy adheres to, in political terms, we may say, a 'politics of difference' upholding the right to differentiation, to self-reliance and to direct participation in the (re)construction of one's own society.

Fundamentally, however, it is a paradigm of reconstructive postmodernism which, in our own words, is also determined by a 'dialectics of cooperation' and 'collective identification'. Accordingly viable and sustainable solutions are sought through dialogue, cooperation and interchange among the multiple and diversity of 'modern' and 'postmodern' actors (the latter also in affinity with the premodern and with tradition). Pertaining to solutions in the many terrains of planetary and human life this dialectics of cooperation and collective identification also take on distinct *political* meaning, hence a 'politics of cooperation' and 'collective identification' seeking permanent solutions through institutional and structural transformation and change at the highest levels of society.

Having pointed out the above dual concept of reconstructive postmodernism guiding WOMP strategic thinking, which aspires to a creative dialectical relationship between modernity and postmodern identities and conceptions, and between a 'politics of difference' and a 'politics of cooperation' and 'collective identification', we may well turn in the final analysis to Richard Falk's list of features which defines the postmodern essence of WOMP and seeks to give it concrete expression. Summarizing in fact much of the discussion in this paper so far these features of postmodern determination (in the above dual sense) listed by Falk are:

(i) the WOMP'S radical critique of 'realism' as a basis for understanding the world,

(ii) the WOMP's blurring of boundaries of space, time, and knowledge, as well as its denial of clarity about limits;

(iii) the WOMP's commitment to human solidarity as well as to cultural diversity:

(iv) the WOMP's comprehensive view of the applicability of democratic processes including all domains of social interaction from the family to the United Nations;

(v) the WOMP's endeavour to occupy a political space that is the domain of concrete struggle and not merely idealism;

(vi) the WOMP's insistence upon moral engagement and political activism as integral elements of scholarly activity, and its consequent rejection of adherence to neutrality and an academic stance of indifference;

(vii) the WOMP's flexible search for allies among elites and social movements;

(viii) the WOMP's commitment to a new world order that entails spiritual aspects of human nature but at the same time proposes various formations of transnational institutionalization of authority and accountability;

(ix) the WOMP's growing ideological kinship to feminist, ecological and ecofeminist world views (Falk 1994: 147).

Global institutional and structural transformation: some concrete notations

As a fundamental component of WOMP perspective this project's emphasis on global institutional and structural transformation, aiming to retain a particular element of global governance, regulation and arrangement serving the common good of all humanity, necessarily calls for some further *concrete* exploration. For this purpose we, for instance, find significant direction for discourse on global reform in a number of notations and perspectives recently put forward by someone like Samir Amin (1995), thereby directing ourselves also outside the direct circle of WOMP and Alternatives publication. However, necessary to immediately qualify ourselves again by stating that we regard these notations and perspectives by Amin to be fully in accordance with WOMP direction of thought, in fact as perspectives that give fuller concrete expression to the WOMP vision and agenda (i.e. to the concrete processes and ends of the project).

In a review of proposals for reform of the Bretton Woods institutions that concludes his outspoken critique of the present form of world economic organisation put forward in discussion, Amin first of all points out a five point strategy for global economic reform made by certain more radical advocates which he (Amin) himself regards as "a very fine project for reform of the world economic and political system". In particular for the fact that it proceeds from the central idea that development can only be revived through a *redistribution* of income both at the global level, that is in favour of peripheries, and at the social level, that is within centres and peripheries in favour of workers and the popular classes; furthermore, that world trade and capital movements must be subordinated to the logic of a demand-side approach to trade (Amin 1995: 47). This project, in concrete terms, consequently entails:

(i) the transformation of the IMF into a genuine world central bank with the power of issuing a real currency that would replace the dollar standard, would ensure a certain stability of exchange rates, and would provide developing countries with the liquidities for "adjustment within growth";

(ii) the transformation of the World Bank into a fund that would collect surpluses (from countries such as Japan and Germany) and lend them to the Third World (and not to the United States);

(iii) the creation of a genuine international trade organisation (ITO) which would secure a full-fledged multilateral system of trade, which in the process would temper the negative aspects of the creation of regional units by preventing them from becoming protected "fortresses" being aggressive to the outside, and which would also have other objectives such as the stabilisation (or revalorization) of raw materials;

(iv) the internalization of environmental issues in World Bank policy which might evolve setting up a world tax on energy, non-renewable resources, etc., that would increase the resources available to the World Bank which could again be used to subsidise respect for environmental concerns in poor countries;

(v) the allocation of a heightened political role for the United Nations to ensure that a direct correlation might be established between development assistance (in a transformed multilateral framework) and political and social democracy; hence, to make sure that development aid might not only be conditional upon respect for individual rights and political democracy, but might also support progressive social policies (e.g. ensuring that wage increases parallel increases in productivity, thereby providing for a more equal redistribution of income, etc.); furthermore, to ensure, in accordance with the 'global interest', that the self-interests of countries benefitting for instance from protectionist measures (which, however, would be permitted) might be offset by taxes paid to the world community by the benefitting country, which again could be used as a development fund for Third World countries. (Amin 1995: 45-47)

Having defined the above five-dimensional strategy in predominant positive terms as "a very fine project for reform", as already mentioned, Amin, however, proceeds by putting forward what he perceives as a necessary "constructive critique" (but not denouncement) of the prescribed project. For Amin, consequently, the project needs to be problematized on the following grounds:

(i) for the fact that many of the analyses underlining the reformist argument are too much inclined to mix value judgements (that the current system is 'bad') with explanations of the reasons motivating the decisions of the dominant powers, thereby obeying the logic of dominant interest (in other words, if we could further interpret Amin's point, that these reformist viewpoints incline to operate in the ideological framework of a 'bad' versus a 'better' or 'good' capitalism rather than in a more overt socialist framework);

(ii) for the fact that the above transformation of the IMF and World Bank should not be seen as the first conditions for transformation but rather as later or end objectives of a long transition process (that if otherwise they in fact are to become the first conditions it might well mean submission to the logic of capitalism as also grounded in point (i) above); hence, that before reaching these other objectives of transformation it would first of all be necessary to construct, on a structural level, a polycentric world on both the economic and the political levels, which must be seen as the basis of political and economic reform;

(iii) for the fact that the virtues of free trade propagated by the above reform project should also be seriously questioned and that the vision of the authors of The new protectionism (Tim Lary and Colin Hines) should be preferred to that of the advocates of a genuine free trade system (Amin 1995 : 48-49).

Following from the above points of critique Amin finally concludes with his own five point strategic proposal which he suggests should take priority in action for global reform. For Amin the priorities for action must be to:

(i) constructing Third World regions organized to face the "five monopolies" of dominant capitalism in such a way to limit their negative effects in the context of ongoing global polarisation;

(ii) reviving the European left and the construction of Europe, enriched by particular progressive social reform toward a "hegemony of labour", integrating Eastern Europe and the former USSR in this project;

(iii) reviewing the financial and commercial relations between Europe, Japan, and the United States in such a way to permit a relative stabilization of exchange rates and force the United States to give up its structural deficit; hence, which would also permit the reorganization of trade relations;

(iv) reconstructing the UN system to make it the locus of political and economic negotiations to organize the articulation of commercial and financial interdependence between the world's major regions; to open negotiations on disarmament; to take the first steps towards the creation of a world taxation in view of objectives of protecting the environment and natural resources, etc.;

(v) reforming the IMF in accordance with the above regional and world interdependencies, and not imply ing its immediate reform into a world bank (Amin 1995: 49-50).

Towards a global civil society approach to a transformative global politics: beyond a social movement approach

The special place denoted by chose from the circle of WOMP and Alternatives to the role of the new social movements in global transformation has already been noted earlier in this paper. This is for instance also well illustrated by someone like Richard Falk when he states that "the new social movements seem at present to embody our best hopes for challenging established and oppressive political, economic, and cultural arrangements at levels of

social complexity, from the interpersonal to the international" (Falk 19S7: 173). But as we also noted earlier, it is also Falk who has observed that social movements are only one source of transformation and that there are also other sources or actors (see again Falk 1987: 178).

Following from Falk's latter observation we could conclude that the emphasis in WOMP and *Alternatives* publication also on global institutional and structural reform, the questioning also of the impact of social movements (e.g. Kothari 1993), and the regard for the transformative potential also of many other actors such as intellectuals and scientists (e.g. Kothari 1987: 288-290; Alatas 1993), the United Nations in intimate relationship with all institutions of civil society in which NGOs are particularly mentioned (Coate, Alger and Lipschutz 1996) and a global political party of issue-specific oppositional institutions and organizations (Kreml and Kegley 1996), etc., clearly points to a perspective or approach (in the unified and collective sense) to global transformation that goes *beyond* what may be called a "social movements approach" to transformation. That is an approach to transformation which as Martin Shaw describes "privileges social movements as a pivotal type of social institution reflecting the contradictions of modernity" and which "claims that social movements are uniquely important social phenomena" for transformation (Shaw 1994: 651); furthermore, which (i.e. the latter social movements approach) may also relate to the perspective by International Relations theorists who assume that social movements are by definition actors in global or international politics in the traditional sense of inter- and intrastate politics (Shaw 1994: 652-53).

What seems then to be emerging from WOMP and *Alternatives* writings but also from writings outside that direct circle complementing the former is the evolution of what Martin Shaw has come to call a "civil society approach" to global politics. Not dispensing with the point of view of the transformative role which social movements might (still) play this perspective calls for "a broader and more complex "civil society" approach (Shaw 1994: 665) which in practice may give way to a united transformative agenda and politics by all actors from the civil society domain. In shore, it is a perspective which echoes authors Coate, Alger and Lipschutz's recent conclusion that global transformative action "will have to come from global civil society - from all its levels" (1996-118). Coming to a closer identification of such a multi-levelled or multi-layered global civil society, as the first necessary step towards conceptual clarification, Martin Shaw subsequently points out that we could identify at least three major types of institutions which comprise an emergent (however not yet fully developed) global civil society. Being expressions of already transnational (global) linkages, networks and collective organizations these three types are: 1) formal organisations linking national institutions (i.e. organisations of parties, churches, unions, professions, educational bodies, media, etc.); 2) linkages of informal networks and movements (e.g. women's and peace groups and movements); and 3) globalist organisations which are established with a specifically global orientation, global membership and activity of global scope (e.g. Amnesty, Greenpeace, Medicines sans Frontières, etc.) (Shaw 1994: 650).

By way of further clarification we suggest, as also evident from the particular circle of literature, that a global civil society approach to a transformative global politics may consequently be summarised along the following points:

Firstly, that the emphasis on social movements, grassroots, national and transnational, remains vital. That these movements present a transformative "politics of difference" but in terms of R.B.J. Walkers identification (writing in *Millennium* but also coming from the direct circle of WOMP and *Alternatives)* also a "politics of connections" and a "politics of movement" which are to be regarded as absolutely crucial to a transformative global politics. As Walker points out, whilst a politics of connections does not necessarily indicate a "politics of a united front or a counterhegemonic strategy social movements indeed do connect, converse, learn from each other, and sometimes develop partial solidarities. Moreover, these social movements are the embodiment of a "politics of movement" which cannot be fully captured by territorial form and which surpasses the spa-

tiotemporal relations and identities of modernity (Walker 1994: 699). As such they represent a politics which may be locate d to a particular space and place but which at the same time is also in a process of constant dislocation, always on the move, always expanding, always linking somewhere whilst dislocating again and moving elsewhere/somewhere/everywhere. As Walker furthermore concludes: «A politics of movement cannot be grasped through categories of containment. A politics of connections cannot be grasped through a metaphysics of inclusions and exclusion, whether of insides and outsides or shoves and belows... An empirica l analysis of social movements, and an interpretation of their significance for what a world politics might become, does not have to be bound by the prejudices of modernity. On the contrary, these prejudices can only ensure that the fine lines separating us from them can never be transgressed. An empirical reading of social movements might show that these fine lines are being transgressed all the time» (Walker 1994: 100).

Hence our suggestion that Walker's notion of a "politics of movement" and a "politics of connections" could be extended to the notion of a "politics of ideas", whereby social movements in their local, national and transnational manifestations are in fact spreading and establishing a new construct of common values and ideas throughout the world, which is to be seen as the ultimate determinant factor for positive structural change. Thus we could say, notwithstanding the absence of apparent links among social movements this "politics of ideas" in fact constitutes a "politics of conn ections" in the strongest sense of the word, slowly bringing into existence a new global value construct (together with other actors from civil society!) which may ultimately become the binding factor of a decisive global transformative politics.

Secondly, then, that the actual transformative role of social movements must also be *problematized* in a global civil society approach. In this sense a global civil society approach directly challenges the overestimation of social movements in what has been identified above as a "social movement approach". More specific, the former approach challenges and problematizes the notion of a grand political strategy of global transformation with which social movements might be associated. Accordingly it appeals to R.B.J. Walker's rectification of what a "politics of connections" and a "Politics of movement" are *not:* «It makes intuitive sense to countenance the spatial extension of a movement here to a movement there, to envisage a convergence of progressive forces acting across those merely artificial boundaries that offend planetary integrity and species identity. Similarities and connections are all too readily translated into grand philosophies of history that point upwards to the projected vision of a global civil society, a global governance, and a properly world politics» (Walker 1994: 100).

Following from the latter note of qualification or rectification by Walker, we state, a global civil society approach would therefore also have to take seriously the following questions and statements about the limitations of social movements in a world politics. Hence, that those favouring or emphasising the significance of social movements as subjects of global transformation (as in fact also propagators of a global civil society approach) must seriously interrogate whether social movements are in fact challenging the constitutive practices of modern politics (Walker 1994: 672) - certainly, a challenge which is to a great extent refuted by current indicators in the field of international political economy. In this regard we are again tempted to quote Walker, who remarks: «Judged from the real heights of statecraft, social movements are but mosquitos on the evening breeze, irritants to those who claim maturity and legitimacy at the centres of political life. Some mosquitos, of course, can have deadly effects. Some movements, it can be claimed, have had tremendous impact on states, societies, economics and cultures. But even large movements are difficult to take seriously once compared to the might and reach of a properly world politics» (Walker 1994: 669).

To proceed with our notations and questions of limitation. Propagators of social movements as subjects of a transformative politics also have to ask whether many of the movements (such as the green movement, Green Peace) have not in fact been coopted by the dominant and mainstream (Kothari 1993: 133-

138); furthermore, whether many social movements are in fact political actors at all (Kothari 1993: 134; Sheth 1987: 166-167; Shaw 1994: 652); given also the differentiations among social movements, hence "the specificity of locations and traditions" (Walker 1994: 690) characterising them, also their episodic and in many (most?) cases narrow "political" objectives, and their tendency towards a middle class bias particularly in the North (Shaw 1994: 653-54), whether they are in fact instruments of mass mobilisation (Shaw 1994: 653) and in any way representatives of a focused and central politics of transformation; consequently, whether they are in fact more effective than other bodies in civil society (Straw 1994: 648); and crucial, finally, whether social movements are not in fact dependent on the other actors of civil society as well as formal political parties for their impact, that is for bringing about the world of transformed relations and structures they are envisioning. It is in view of such problematization, then, that we find much orientation in the following concluding statements by Martin Shaw of social movements' dependence on a wider range of actors and institutions for their meaningful political articulation: «Social movements depend closely on the other institutions of civil society. On the one hand, although they are widely seen as bypassing traditional institutions such as parties, churches and trade unions, they also exist in relation to these. They are often dependent on political parties, in particular, in order to translate social movement demands into political agenda items which have a serious chance of turning into state policy. Social movements also depend on a wider ideological discourse, which develops through university intellectuals but also through interchange with Green and traditional left-wing parties, through the mass media, and through other networks in civil society. In this way, as in others, social movements cannot be seen as completely distinctive social phenomena, but are embedded in the larger complex of relationships in civil society. They overlap and share many characteristics with other civil society institutions» (Shaw 1994: 666).

From the latter quotation naturally follows our *third* and final point qualifying a global civil society approach to a transformative global politics. Such an approach, for one recognises the dependence of social movements on a wider range of civil society and political actors for meaningful political articulation. However, we would again like to qualify such recognition by in fact rather proposing the notion of interdependence as the operating framework, whereby it is acknowledged that all those actors or institutions of civil society, however also extended to the realm of party and state politics, who are the serious propagators of a new sustainable and just world are *all* dependent on each other to obtain their *common* goal. Stipulating such interdependence we are, however, reminded by Martin Shaw that the existence of global civil society is still more potential than actual and that it is (regrettably) only following relatively slowly on economic globalization which has gathered very rapid momentum (Shaw 1994: 655). Not being in disregard of the fact that a mobilising process towards global civil society (as an actor or interlinking groups of actors in globalized political, economic and social processes) may well have come into motion already (to contradict Shaw's perspective again somewhat), we conclude that the great challenge which seems to lie ahead therefore, adhering to a global civil society approach to a transformative global Politics, is for the actors and institutions of civil society to purposefully and strategically work for more effective and binding relationships, networks and coalitions among themselves which may ultimately capacitate them to meaningfully and in a decisive way (as a collective force) influence and change interstate relationships and the processes of global governance. Necessarily to add that what must be ultimately at stake here is the far-reaching integration of civil society actors and institutions (from the grassroots up) into the transformed arrangement(s) of global governance processes. As authors Coate, Alger and Lipschutz have also made the point, in final conclusion: «What remains a major challenge is how such bodies [from civil society aspiring/pursuing a sustainable development approach], as well as other even more amorphous collectivities such as scientists and other opinion communities, can be integrated effec-

tively into global governance processes and the work of IGOs. In addition, global norms as they relate to people-centred development need to bloom from the roots up, not from the top down. For this actually to happen, the numerous and varied social groupings with which people most closely identify in the context of any particular issue setting - whether they be transnational social movements, religious orders, economic groupings, legal/political units, or whatever - need to be viewed and treated as acceptable partners for transnational cooperation and collaboration» (Coate, Alger and Lipschutz 1996: 111-12).

The next step: a global political party?

«… the divisions between rich and poor societies are quite extreme, and could easily become the source of great international tensions. There is no central global agency which could effectively control these tensions, or enforce a world redistribution of wealth». - Anthony Giddens (1989: 547). «Political excess requires excessive thought. Excessive thought requires the willingness to think beyond accepted limits... The issue of pushing thought to the limits and beyond so as to engage in interpretation and criticism, criticism that is driven by ethico-political concerns, attentive to history and concerned with the expansive and practical dilemmas of world politics. That work is being done now. It repays thoughtful attention» (David Campbell 1994: 315).

Having indicated the evolution of perspective in WOMP and *Alternatives* publication, but also outside the direct circle of the latter, from a social movements approach to a global civil society approach as strategic framework of a transformative global politics, we finally conclude our discussion by noticing that this evolution of perspective is now also being further stretched by William Kreml and Charles Kegley's suggestion of a "global political party" put forward in the most recent issue *of Alternatives*, as already mentioned earlier. We content ourselves here with only a very brief exploration of the idea (as put forward by Kreml and Kegley), which in more elaborate discussion has to be the objective of another paper.

For Kreml and Kegley, then, the moment must now be seized, at this point in history, by issue-specific oppositional groups such as Greenpeace, Sierra Club International, the World Council of Churches, Amnesty International, SANE, the Rainforest Action Network, Conservation International, the Nature Conservancy, the World Wildlife Fund, Survival International, Save the Children, Habitat for Humanity, Physicians for Social Responsibility, and similar organisations, along with those nation-states and regional political organisations that are prepared to participate in a more democratic world, to establish the next instrument towards the world's dialectical progress towards real world justice. That instrument, for them, is a global political party (Kreml and Kegley 1996: 133).

For Kreml and Kegley the ideological base upon which their proposed global political party is to operate is in particular that of the WOMP. Accordingly the party is to articulate and bring into motion the processes towards a new world order which Richard Falk, amongst others from the WOMP, has envisioned as "to be created by a combination of social forces acting effectively and on behalf of such world order values as non-violence, economic and social justice, human rights and democracy, and environmental quality" (Kreml and Kegley 1996: 126). But in further full accordance with WOMP ideology Kreml and Kegley are also very well aware and sensitive for the fact that the party they are proposing is not to "simply mirror the narrowness" of hegemonic statist and developmental views of the world, hence a party that would not simply commit "the domestic fallacy" on a global level, thereby imposing (as current global forces are in fact doing) homogeneity and accordingly a singular universalise on all of the world's peoples (Kreml and Kegley 1996: 127, 130, 132). On the contrary those (postmodern) ideals of the WOMP which acknowledge and celebrate difference and resist totalizing modes of thought (Kreml

and Kegley 1996: 126) are to constitute the cognitive basis of such party: «At its foundation, our proposal for a global political party only builds upon the assertions of subjective multiplicity... It is a state of mind that recognises the multiplicity of other minds, as sell as other objective circumstances, that will alone permit a transformation from single-minded observances of singular forms of global description to multiple perspectives upon multiple aspirations. The new world's transformation to such a vision can transcend the orthodox bilateral, cognitively analytic, state-centred perspectives on today's global reality». (Kreml and Kegley 1996: 131).

Build on such a cognitive basis Kreml and Kegley consequently envisions their proposed political party "to serve as the institutional core of a transnational political opposition movement" (Kreml and Kegley 1996: 124) working towards an "alternative form of universalise" to respond to global equity needs (Kreml and Kegley 1996: 130). For Kreml and Kegley, then, the party they are proposing would be at the heart of a global political activity that in a dialectical way would support the strivings of multiple aspirations whilst at the same time would be determined by "an aggregational, comprehensive vision", hence "one that specifically incorporates differentiations among the very qualities of the variables that are to be included in the global equation" (Kreml and Kegley 1996: 125).

Hitherto our short exploration of Kreml and Kegley's idea of a global political party. In the subheading above we have put the notion of such party in question form. Kreml and Kegley, however, in their article, has put the idea in the affirmative since for them "no principles, and no institutions, currently exist through which a freshly constituted global public might organise itself to oppose the new reign of the great powers" (Kreml and Kegley 1996: 124). For these two writers, consequently, a global political party is to fill this gap. We, on the other hand, would be somewhat more reticent by stating that we want to recognise some already existing oppositional force in the activities, initiatives and symbolisms of many alternative actors and movements across the world - as we have put forward in this paper. However, whilst this is said we also have acknowledged the need for a far greater theory and praxis of coherent normative political action, in the oppositional sense, in our discussion above. We have therefore also identified the need, as evident from a certain circle of intellectual perspective, to shift from a social movement approach to a transformative global politics to a global civil society approach. We may finally ask: What oppositional force or forces are going to have enough penetrating power to bring about a radical transformation of the United Nations institutions which would give civil society institutions and actors a far greater reach and participation in decision-making, as writers Coate, Alger and Lipschutz are arguing for? Furthermore, what force or forces are going to have sufficient penetrating power to bring about the above-mentioned global institutional and structural transformation which Samir Amin is arguing for - including in particular the radical reform of the Bretton Woods institutions and regulations? Moreover, what force or forces could have sufficient penetrating power to make the realization of a polycentric world, hence a world build on the pillars of equity, diversity, plurality and decentralization but also mutual cooperation and exchange (on the basis of equity), a real possibility? And finally, what could be the official or real mouthpiece or instrument which may unite all the alternative actors and movements and actors and movements for alternatives into the truly coherent normative political force that we have argued for in this paper, thus also as the real political instrument of a global civil society approach to global transformation? An answer or answers to these questions, we conclude also from our side, may well lead us to together with Kreml and Kegley put the idea of a global political party in the affirmative.

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Recent United Nations activities in connection with the establishment of a permanent international criminal court and the role of the Association internationale de droit pénal (AIDP) and the Istituto Superiore Internazionale di Scienze Criminali (ISISC)

by Cherif Bassiouni *

1. Introduction

The United Nations (U.N.) activities described below are the continuation of efforts which commenced at the close of World Wat I and in which the AIDP has been active since 1926, and the ISISC since 1976 [1].

Among scholarly and professional organisations, the AIDP has been a historical leader on the question of establishing an international criminal court (ICC). My predecessors have all supported an ICC and worked diligently for its establishment. Past Presidents Vespasien Pella, Paul Cornil, Jean Graven, Pierre Bouzat and Hans-Heinrih Jescheck deserve our appreciation. But it is the uninterrupted continuity of efforts of the Association from 1926 which merits particular recognition.

Since 1976, the Siracusa Institute has followed the AIDP's path and deserves much credit for its consistent activities and efforts in promoting an ICC. Among these activities are the conferences of December 1994 and 1995 which produced two documents that integrated the International Law Commission's (ILC) 1994 Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court (ICC) with proposed amendments developed by a group of scholars and experts who convened in Siracusa at these two conferences. The 1994 document was called the "Siracusa Draft" and the 1995 document the "Updated Siracusa Draft."

The 1995 "Siracusa Draft" proved useful at the meetings of the U.N. General Assembly Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court and the 1996 "Updated Siracusa Draft" also proved useful at the First Session of the U.N. General Assembly Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court whose work is described below. The two Siracusa texts were the only unofficial reports used in these official U.N. meetings and were consistently referred to in the deliberations of both bodies. They were also mentioned in the Final Report of the 1995 Ad Hoc Committee and in the Interim Summary Report of the 1996 Preparatory Committee. This special recognition is a tribute to the AIDP, ISISC, and the other esteemed organizations mentioned below as well as to the scholars and experts who contributed to those two texts.

The two drafts were elaborated, as stated above, at meetings held in Siracusa in December '94 and '95. The December '94 meeting was dedicated to the memory of our late colleague Fernand Boulan, to whom this volume is also dedicated. Both meetings were held "in cooperation with the United Nattons Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Division" and "Under the Auspices of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe." The two meetings were co-sponsored by distinguished organisations whose contributions to human rights and justice are well-established and highly esteemed. They are: Amnesty International (A.I.) (London); Association internationale de droit pénal (AIDP) (Paris); Conseil Régional d'Aix-Marseilles (Aix-en-Provence); Faculté de Droit et de Sciences Politiques, Université d'Aix-Marseilles (Aix-en-Province); Human Rights Watch (HRW) (New York), International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy (ICCLR&CJP) (Vancouver); International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) (Geneva); International Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul University (IHRLI) (Chicago); International Scientific and Professional Advisory Council (ISPAC) (Milano); Max-Planck Institute for International and Comparative Criminal Law (M-PII&CCL) (Freiburg, i.br.); Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA) (New York); World Federalist Association (WFA) (Washington).

The scholarly contributions of the participating experts, whose names are listed in the two documents were of the highest standards. Their work, along with the academic and professional standing of the co-sponsoring organisations, have, in some small part, made possible

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(1) These efforts are described in M. Cherif Bassiouni, *A Draft International Code and Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal (1987).See also A Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal* in Volume 9 NOUVELLES ETUDES PÉNALES (1993), and for the French and Spanish texts see 10 NOUVELLES ETUDES PÉNALES (1994).

the forward movement we are now witnessing at the U.N.

The role of NGO's, particularly those in the human rights field has, in the last two decades greatly sensitised world public opinion to the need for international criminal justice and for the rejection of impunity for international crimes and grave violations of fundamental human rights. In part, because of the efforts of scholarly and human rights organizations and in part because of tragic contemporary events, world public opinion demands justice and rejects impunity. As such, it is fat ahead of many governments on the issue of international criminal justice. Indeed, the support that world public opinion has demonstrated for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTFY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) evidences this proposition.

2. The evolution of the U.N.'s codification efforts

The U.N.'s interest in codifying international crimes started in 1947 as an outgrowth of the post-WWII prosecutions. That year the G.A. asked the ILC to produce a Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. The ILC worked on that text from 1947 to 1954. But when its task was completed, the G.A. tabled the 1954 Draft Code of Offences because another Committee had not yet defined aggression which was to be part of the Draft Code. For political reasons, the G.A. had removed from the ILC's 1947 mandate the definition of aggression and in 1950 it had set up a Special Committee to define it. That Committee on defining aggression completed its work in 1974, and the G.A. adopted a resolution by consensus on the definition of aggression. The G.A. did not, however embody that definition into a treaty prohibiting and proscribing aggression. Thus the prohibition of aggression remains to be codified as an international crime.

With the G.A.'s adoption of the definition of aggression, the reason for tabling the 1954 Draft Code of Offences no longer existed. But it was only in 1982 that the G.A. mandated the ILC once again to take up the question of the Draft Code of Offences. At that point, the ILC smarted its work *ab initio* and in 1991, the ILC's Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind was first reported to the G.A. After receiving comments by Member-States, mostly unfavourable[2], the ILC revised that text several times with additional revisions still expected in 1996. And that is why the ILC's work on the codification of crimes was de-coupled from its work on an ICC.

The contemporary de-coupling of the Draft Code of Crimes and the Draft Statute for an ICC ate related to the substantive questions raised by the Draft Code of Crimes. But the earlier de-coupling of the two subjects had been for political reasons. Indeed, the G.A.'s mandates to the ILC from 1947 to 1991 were to prepare a code of crimes and did not include the elaboration of a draft statute for an ICC.

As evidence of the political will to separate the two related subjects, the G.A., in 1950, set up a Special Committee to prepare a Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court. That Committee produced a text in 1951 which was revised in 1953. But the 1953 text was tabled by the G.A. that same year because the ILC's Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind had not been completed, and when the ILC text was completed in 1954, as stated above, it was tabled because the Committee to Define Aggression had not completed its work.

Since WWII, the essential strategy used by those who opposed the codification of international criminal law and the establishment of an ICC has been to divide between several bodies what should have been a comprehensive work done by a single body. These bodies met in separate places and at different times, and they produced different parts of a whole that were never put together. When each body produced a report, that report was tabled because the other body had not completed its report, and so on for over fifty years. It was politics using bureaucratic means to achieve the desired end of inconclusive results. But times have changed.

(2) *See a Commentary on the ILC's Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind in 11 NEP* (1995), see also for our earlier *project de Code Pénal international*, 52 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PÉNAL (N) 1-2/1981)

3. The new thrust **for an ICC**

The question of an ICC did not come up again before the G.A. between 1953 and 1989, when it was raised at a Special Session of the G.A. on the subject of drugs. At that Session, Trinidad and Tobago [3] suggested consideration of establishing a specialized international criminal court for drug-related offenses [4].

Based on the 1989 G.A.'s Special Session, the ILC was asked in 1990 to report on an international Criminal Jurisdiction, but not to prepare a draft statute. The ILC prepared a report in 1991 which was well received by the G.A.'s Sixth Committee, and it was asked to continue its work on that topic. In 1993, the ILC, to its credit, went beyond preparing a report, it prepared a Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal. This text had many similarities to the Draft Statute for the Creation of an international Criminal Jurisdiction to Implement the *Apartheid* Convention[5]. Though the 1993 Draft Statute was well received by the Sixth Committee, the ILC amended its 1993 text to reflect certain governmental political considerations. The revised text was submitted in 1994 to the Sixth Committee, at the G.A.'s Forty-Ninth Session and is the basis of the present work described below.

In December 1994, the G.A. adopted Resolution 49/53 which created an *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Establishment of all International Criminal Court. The *Ad hoc* Committee, which was open to all U.N. Member-States, met for two sessions (two weeks each, in April and August 1995) and fully discussed the issues relating to an ICC on the basis of the 1994 ILC Draft Statute. The *Ad hoc* Committee also took into account the "Siracusa Draft" containing proposed amendments to the 1994 ILC Draft [6]. By then a new political climate had developed and in December 1995, the G.A. adopted Resolution 50/46 setting up a Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, open to all Member-States, to meet in two sessions (three weeks each), February-March and August, 1996, and to prepare "consolidated texts" for a draft ICC statute. unlike the *AdHoc* Committee, which essentially discussed issues, the Preparatory Committee was mandated to draft text. But States who oppose an ICC or wish to put it off to some future time, have managed to delay drafting during that First Session.

The Preparatory Committee concluded its First Session with the adoption of an interim summary report which will be published as a U.N. document in August-September 1996 and will thereafter become part of the Final Report of the Preparatory Committee after the conclusion of the Second Session in August 1996. The Final Report will also contain the text of the Statute (with eventual alternative texts) and will be submitted to the Sixth Committee at the Fifty-First Session of the G.A. this fall. That Agenda item will be considered by the G.A. during the first week of December. If the G.A. considers the work of the Preparatory Committee as sufficient, it is expected to call for a Plenipotentiary Conference in 1997. Italy has offered to host such a conference. But if the G.A. finds the Preparatory Committee's Report and draft statute as needing additional work, it could extend its mandate into 1997, and at the same time either set a date for the Plenipotentiary Conference in late 1997 or in early 1998.

4. Some of the complex issues facing the Preparatory Committee

Notwithstanding the complexity of the issues raised by an ICC, it is clear that the technical aspects of a draft statute can readily be resolved, particularly in view of past scholarly and professional efforts and more recent preparatory work, such as the "Updated Siracusa Draft." But governments who either oppose an ICC or are not yet ready to decide the question, have delayed progress on drafting by means of protracted discussions of technical, as well as substantive issues. Frequently government representatives at those sessions do not have the necessary expert advice on international criminal law and comparative criminal law and procedure. Many developing States simply do not have sufficient personnel and resources to supplement their U.N. Missions with the needed expertise. As a result, some of the discussions on technical questions remain incon-

(3) This was due to the efforts of the then Prime Minister Arthur Robinson from Trinidad and Tobago who attended two of Siracusa's Conferences on the ICC. His efforts of many years in support of an ICC deserve recognition.

(4) An earlier Convention on terrorism had been elaborated by the League of Nations in 1937 with a Protocol establishing an ICC. That Convention however, was only ratified by India and never entered into effect. The AIDP's Vespasian Pella played an important role in bringing about that Convention and protocol and he is still remembered for that important contribution

(5) U.N. Doc E/CN.4/1426,19 January 1980. That Draft Statute was prepared for the U.N.

(6) See Final report Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court GAOR. Fifth Session, Supp. N)22, U.N, Doc. Res. A/50/22, 6 September 1995.

clusive, though the level of specificity has developed considerably since the discussions of the Ad Hoc Committee. There is no doubt that progress is evident at the Preparatory Committee, but it ¡s still too slow.

The problems faced by the Preparatory Committee do not lie with technical questions like "General Principles of Criminal Responsibility", and "Rules of Procedure and Evidence" even though these subjects are fraught with difficulties. Instead, they lie in the political judgments that have to be made by many governments. These include but ate not limited to, the following questions:

(a) What crimes are to be included in the "inherent" jurisdiction of the ICC? So far, four core crimes are contemplated—Aggression, Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and Wat Crimes.

(b) How to define these fout core crimes?

(i) Aggression has no definition under treaty law and the Preparatory Committee must define that crime in keeping with the principles of legality. But the ICC Statute must also take into account the possible jurisdictional overlap with the Security Council (S.C.) which has the power and authority to decide what constitutes aggression. The latter, however, is a political body and cannot make legal determinations, hence the problem of how to reconcile the political role of the S.C. and the judicial role of the ICC is important. Some states prefer to leave the question of aggression entirely to the S.C., even though this would introduce a political element in what should be exclusively a judicial matter. For this and other reasons, some states prefer, at present, not lo include aggression within the inherent jurisdiction of the ICC and leave that question for another time when there is more consensus on the justiciability of aggression, and the personal criminal responsibility of its perpetrators. On the other hand, a number of states want to see the principles of Nuremberg and Tokyo upheld. They prefer to define the crime in juridical terms and leave its application to the ICC to decide as a judicial matter, free from the political considerations of the S.C. As to the question of potential conflict with the S.C., the proponents of justiciability note that the S.C. has never decided that a given situation constituted aggression under the 1974 G.A resolution,

(ii) Genocide is defined in Article 11 of the 1948 Convention, but that definition does not include social and political groups. If these groups are to be included in the ICC's draft it would be more encompassing than the 1948 Convention, and there would be two overlapping definitions. Furthermore the 1948 Genocide Convention requires specific intent which can be more easily proven with respect to policy-makers, than with respect to executors of the policy. Should that be corrected? If so, then the same problems stated above also arise and many states are reluctant to make any changes to the definition of the Genocide Conventions. Conversely, some states are desirous of adding more requirements to the existing definition, which would weaken it. The outcome however is likely to be the adoption of the Genocide Convention's definition in Articles II and III.

(iii) Crimes Against Humanity have not been the subject of an international convention since it was covered the Statute of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT) Article 6(c). The 1993 Statutes of the ICTFY and ICTR which are the product of S.C. resolution follow this earlier definition, though with some slight modification. The Preparatory Committee must therefore define that crime without breaking faith with the past and at the same time uphold the principles of legality. But it also has to take into account contemporary needs to expand the scope of the proscriptions and to make them more precise. This requires precise legal terms in defining the elements of the offense and the acts constituting the crime. Many states, however, wish to reduce the crime's scope of protection and application, and the need for precision and concrete terms provides fertile ground for opposing views which are still to be resolved. Reasonable compromise, however, can be anticipated,

(iv) The concept of war crimes covers a wide range of activities, subjects and participants and derives from several legal sources. They are the 4 Hague Convention (Especially Hague IV and Annexes); the derives customary law *of* armed conflict which is not codified; the law of the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949

and the two 1977 Additional Protocols; and other conventions which are binding on their signatories only. Customary law is not codified and there is no agreement so far as to its specific content for the purposes of defining it in an article of the ICC's Statute. Proper codification of the customary law of armed conflicts requires more than a single article. But that does not appear to be likely because some states would prefer ambiguity to specificity in this area.

Of greater significance however is the fact that the international regulation of armed conflict is most developed with respect to conflicts of an international character, while conflicts of a non-international character are insufficiently defined and need to be more decidedly recognized as punishable war crimes. Indeed the time has come to abandon the artificial distinction between conflicts of an international and non-international character. But this too is a complicated task and governments are taking different positions on it. Some even wish to exclude conflicts of a non-international character from the ICC's war crimes definition. This position would roll back the gains made in the past forty years concerning the protection of civilians in these types of conflicts.

Among such states are those that provide military personnel to peace-keeping operations. They do not want their military or individual members of their armed forces to be charged with war crimes or to be subject to prosecution for conduct while on these foreign missions. One solution proposed by this writer is to give precedence to the military justice system of the state whose personnel are charged with committing such crimes provided that the military justice in question is effective and fair. Additionally the war crimes provision could be drafted to apply in cases where the violations are systematic or widespread. This would eliminate limited cases of individual violations.

Nevertheless there are some states who wish to limit and even to retrogress on the protections developed by international humanitarian law in the last fifty years as the price for accepting an ICC with inherent jurisdiction over even a more limited range of war crimes,

(c) What jurisdictional triggering mechanisms shall be established with respect to the four core crimes? Are cases or "complaints" to be brought by a Member-State, other states, the Security Council the Prosecutor or by all of these means? The Security Council's Permanent Five favour a strong role for the S.C. Some among them would even limit the ICC to cases referred to it by the S.C. But this would make the ICC a permanent ad hoc tribunal for the S.C., and that is opposed by many states. Some states oppose, on the other hand, the idea that the Prosecutor should be allowed to bring any criminal action sua *sponte*. Instead they want only states to be able to bring an action or "complaint" before the ICC. The clear purpose for this position is to make the initiation of prosecution subject to a political decision by a state. Many states, however, favour an independent Prosecutor capable of initiating criminal actions.

(d) Relations between the ICC and national criminal jurisdictions are described with the term "Complementarity". The term is being used by some states to subordinate the jurisdiction of the ICC to the consent of the concerned or interested states. According to that view, the ICE as a "complement" to national criminal jurisdictions, can only be jurisdictionally seized of a case after the concerned or interested national criminal jurisdictions have consented to it. Conversely, there are a number of states who see the ICC as exercising its jurisdiction when national legal systems are unwilling, unable or incapable of acting or when such national action would be unfair. But the opposition to this view is strong by those who hold dear traditional notions of sovereignty.

Thus there are issues as to when the ICC is to have primacy over national jurisdiction. This depends on a number of factors, such as, the nature of the crimes, the harm committed, the number of offenders, the capacity of the state where the crime occurred to prosecute effectively and fairly and other policy and contextual factors. All of these issues can be resolved in a number of ways that would satisfy most states. For example, if an action is referred to the ICC by the S.C., then clearly the ICC would have primacy over national jurisdictions. These questions can easily be resolved once the broader political questions are decided. Another situation is where the crime charged is

"Genocide" or "Crimes Against Humanity" arising out of a conflict which has left the state where these crimes occurred without a functioning legal system. Obviously one could not argue in such cases that primacy should be given to the defunct or ineffective national criminal jurisdiction.

(e) Next, there is the question of whether the ICC will have the power to require State-Parties to surrender persons and to provide legal assistance, or whether the ICC will be deemend to be like any other state seeking cooperation in penal matters and thereby become subject to the laws and practices of the requested state. This question can easily be resolved once the ultimate questions of "complementary" and "primacy" are decided.

(f) Lastly, should the ICC have ancillary jurisdiction over what the ILC calls "treaty crimes" among which are "terrorism" and "drug-related offences"? Some major powers ate opposed to this ancillary jurisdiction because they are fearful that this would be a way for states who are unwilling to enforce these proscriptions to avoid having to do so by passing that obligation to the ICC. But other states are in favour of including at least these two crimes. The problem here is not only how to define these crimes, but what "consent" mechanisms will be required of the various interested states before the ICC can exercise jurisdiction. There is also a practical problem of some significance. Terrorism and drug-related crimes are frequently discovered by means of "intelligence" capabilities and some governments are reluctant to disclose these sources to an ICC, and to open these matters to public knowledge in the course of a trial. The solution proposed by this writer is to allow the Prosecutor in these cases to name a "special prosecutor" from the state bringing the action or "complaint," and to allow that "special prosecutor," in consultation with his government's authorities to decide what evidence to use in light of the ICC's rules of procedure and evidence. This would provide assurances to the state initiating the action or "complaint" that it make its own decisions as to disclosure of sources of information.

(g) In addition to these substantive questions, there are also other significant issues pertaining to the nature of ICC. Among them: (i) Is the ICC to be created by treaty outside the framework of the U.N., or should it be pan of the U.N.? At present the prevailing view is to have the ICC as a treaty-created institution, linked to the U.N. by a special agreement to be developed after the ICC treaty enters into effect. Would that formula weaken the ICC? (ii) If it were pan of the U.N., how influential will the State-Parties be in the affairs of the ICC and to what extent could that affect the independence of the institution, and its public credibility?

(h) Among the issues that the Preparatory Committee will not address is a feasibility study on the administrative structure of the institution, its personnel, technical needs, and its costs. The absence of this practical dimension will have an impact on the actual realization of an ICC, once the treaty that establishes it enters into effect.

(i) Another issue which the Preparatory Committee is not scheduled to consider, and which the ILC has not addressed is that of victim compensation. Regrettably, neither the ICTFY nor the ICTR deal with that important issue. It is the belief of this writer that victim compensation is an indispensable ingredient of international criminal justice. Indeed, while victims want to see their aggressors prosecuted and punished, it is generally recognized that they also want, and need compensation. Why most states are not willing to consider that question is perplexing.

The issues outlined above are only some of the many that face the Preparatory Committee and that will face a Plenipotentiary Conference.

But even beyond that, the actual achievement of an effectively functioning institution will take much more work. The experiences of the ICTFY and ICTR are clear reminders of the start-up difficulties and other practical problems that face such new institutions. These practical difficulties and problems should be addressed now. States should know before making a decision for or against an ICC what is expected of such an institution, how it will function, and what its expected costs are likely to be [7].

(7) Considering that the ICTFY's costs in the last two years have exceeded 60 million U.S. dollars, it is not unreasonable to project a cost of 100 million U.S. dollars as the average annual cost of an ICC, But that is less that 5% of the annual costs of U.N. peacekeeping operations.

Conclusion

The establishment of ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are important steps, though grudgingly undertaken by the Security Council. Even if they have not yet produced a record on which to be judged, their establishment is a major accomplishment. But, their existence depends on the will of the Security Council which created them and whose authority is to deal with threats to peace and the maintenance of peace. Once peace is restored, the Council loses its competence and the tribunals it created must come to a close. Unless we have a judicial institution to continue the work begun and to put an end to the practice of impunity, perpetrators will go free, deterrence will dissipate and justice will be discredited, and the chances for peace will be reduced.

What is needed therefore is a permanent international criminal court, free from political manipulations and, with the capability of prosecuting victors and defeated, soldiers and generals, effectively and fairly.

Victims are entitled to justice, offenders deserve punishment and the world needs to establish a historic record of major international crimes, if for no other reasons than to know the truth and to educate future generations. Maybe then we can deter potential criminals and avoid the repetition of those crimes. Otherwise we are condemned to repeat the terrible mistakes of the past.

This is an idea whose time has not only come, but which is long overdue.

The AIDP and ISISC will continue to be engaged in this process until that goal is achieved.

NGOs and the World Bank * (Part I)

1. Background

In recent years, a new relationship has developed between the Bank and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs). NGOs have become increasingly interested in Bank project and policy work. At the same time, they have become much more significant to the Bank in offering important new partnerships in poverty reduction, analysis, and participatory approaches. Understanding the "NGO phenomenon" why many NGOs have become interested in the Bank and are critical of it, and which NGOs the Bank is most likely to establish a partnership with - is an important starting point for considering how to strengthen such partnerships.

The NGO Explosion

The NGO sector has mushroomed over the past two decades: it is now a key actor in development assistance. The programs of international NGOs doubled in real size between 1975 and 1985; by 1993 they represented 14 percent of all development assistance, or $8.5 billion per annum. NGOs are deriving an increasing proportion of their total funding from official development assistance (ODA); ODA provided 1.5 percent of international NGO income in 1970, and 30 percent in 1993. Including food aid, OECD donors now channel about 5 percent of their ODA through NGOs; and at least one country, the United States, so channels 11 percent of its ODA. These developments are reflected in rapid growth in the sector in borrowing countries: for example, there are an estimated 18,000 registered NGOs in the Philippines and 3,000 in Brazil; in India, registered NGOs handle $520 million per year, or 25 percent of all external aid.

. This growing role has been reflected in Bank operations. Among Bank-financed projects approved between FY73 and FY88 [1], only about 6 percent involved any form of collaboration with NGOs; 41 percent of projects approved in FY95 involved such collaboration. Often, NGO collaboration is no more than a minor role during the project implementation stage, however the depth of NGO involvement has increased in recent years. The scope of collaboration (which is most extensive in Africa) has broadened to include most major sectors and all products at all stages of Bank involvement.

A Typology of NGOs

The term "nongovernmental organisations" embraces a myriad of different types of agencies. At its broadest, it includes all civil society organisations, that is, ail groupings of individuals that fall outside the public and for-profit sectors, whether legally constituted or informal, established or transient. In this paper we restrict our focus to organisations that work in the fields of development, welfare, and environmental protection or that comprise or represent poor or vulnerable people. Even within this definition, it is important to distinguish different categories of NGOs, The Bank interacts principally with two main groups of NGOs:

(a) *Operational* NGOs, whose primary purpose is running or funding programs designed to contribute to development, environmental management, welfare, or emergency relief. These include international organisations, typically headquartered in developed countries; national organisations which usually operate in individual developing countries often as intermediary NGOs; and community-based organisations (CBOs), which serve a specific population group in a narrow geographic area.

(b) *Advocacy* NGOs, whose primary purpose is advocating a specific point of view or concern and which seek to influence the policies and practices of the Bank, governments, and other bodies. These are based mostly, but not exclusively, in developed countries. Indeed a number of very effective developing country based advocacy NGOs are now emerging. They are effective at networking internationally, and they increasingly draw evidence from partners based in developing countries.

The differences between these types of NGOs should not be viewed as rigid, however. While some NGOs concentrate on relief and service delivery and have virtually no analytical or policy function, and some are lobbying

* **Poverty** and Social Policy Department, **of the** World **Bank, June 1996**
(1) FY = **Financial Year**

NGOs with no operational base, the majority fall somewhere between these extremes. Operational NGOs and CBOs usually have more field-level experience that is relevant to the Bank; but thoughtful, well-connected advocacy groups may also offer invaluable grass-roots insights and challenge conventional thinking. Similarly, local branches of international NGOs may have a good record in participatory approaches and may therefore be effective partners in some situations.

In earlier years it was mostly advocacy organisations in industrialised countries that sought to challenge or influence the Bank's policies. Recently, however, many of the larger international NGOs (such as Oxfam, World Vision, and Save the Children) have devoted more resources to policy analysis and lobbying, and advocacy groups and networks have emerged in developing regions (e.g., the Third World Network, the Asian NGO Coalition, the Forum of African Voluntary Development Organizations, and the Inter-Africa Group). The distinction between advocacy and operational NGOs is now less clear. At the same time, the early dominance of environmental NGOs in the Bank-NGO dialogue has become less pronounced as new categories of advocacy groups, such as energy NGOs and human rights and women's organisations, arrive on the Bank's stage.

The Bank's Interest in NGOs

The Bank's agenda has become more complex in recent years as it has given greater prominence to issues of poverty, participation, gender, environment, governance, capacity building, and implementation quality. The Bank's portfolio is also undergoing a significant shift toward financing the social sectors, conservation programs, and policy reform. The Bank's agenda has become more complex in recent years as it has given greater prominence to issues of poverty, participation, gender, environment, governance, capacity building, and implementation quality. The Bank's portfolio is also undergoing a significant shift toward financing the social sectors, conservation programs, and policy reform. For example, in the period fiscal 1981 to 1983, the Bank's total lending for human capital development averaged 5 percent of lending, but by fiscal 1993-1995, it equated 16 percent of lending. The Bank is now the largest external provider of resources for social investment in the developing world. The Bank's environment program is the world's largest program of environmental investment, totalling 10.7 billion dollars in fiscal 1995. In fiscal 1985, there was one active environmental project in the portfolio while the fiscal 1995 environmental portfolio numbers 137 active projects. Much of the broadened agenda involves areas in which many NGOs have clear strengths. NGOs often work closely with vulnerable groups and the poor; many give priority to helping poorer groups make development decisions and allocate resources. They often are energetic in ensuring that women are fairly represented in decision-making; have insights to the trade-offs and complementarities between environmental protection and the needs of indigenous populations; emphasize protecting vulnerable groups from capricious actions and improper practices of local officials and the elite; and help central and local government increase their capacity. They are often able to help governments, the Bank, and others to identify problems in the implementation of their programs.

Tapping into this NGO know-how is the principal reason why the Bank should build up more effective partnerships with NGOs. Proficient, experienced NGOs are on the front line of development and they understand its complexity. By interacting consistently with them, the Bank can both broaden NGOs' awareness of its development work and draw on their capacities to enhance its own development impact, particularly in the areas of poverty reduction and environmental sustainability. For example, the series of workshops initiated in Tanzania, Argentina, India, and other countries explain to NGOs the Bank's project approaches and therefore pave the way to fuller collaboration. The Bank also needs to give greater priority to working with governments to improve the environment for NGOs and civil society, and to collaborate more effectively with NGOs, A

number of themes in the Bank's policy work are directly applicable to improving NGO impact (such as the importance of stable, non-discriminatory and clear regulatory rules, fair tax regimes, etc.). Relevant examples are the studies and policy reflections on NGO-state relationships that the Bank has launched jointly with government and NGOs in Indonesia and Bangladesh.

Another important aspect of Bank-NGO relations is the key political role of the NGO community. NGOs, especially those whose activities include advocacy and public education, can play an important role in maintaining a positive climate of public opinion and the necessary international support for development assistance (including for IDA). Sustained support for the Bank by the NGO community will depend on the Bank's commitment to its poverty alleviation agenda and its ability to work more effectively with NGOs.

NGO *Interest in the Bank*

NGOs interact with the Bank in a variety of ways. The three driving interests can be identified as operational partnership (resources, influencing government's policies, and influencing the Bank's policies. Some pursue more than one of these. First, many view the Bank as a large presence in the development field, and as a source of expertise and financing, and they are anxious to be involved in Bank operations, often through contracts to implement projects.

Second, some NGOs are attempting strategic use of their experience to achieve a greater impact than is possible through direct programs alone. They aim to encourage governments and official agencies to adopt approaches that they have pioneered, to use them as partners in service delivery, and to listen to their advice on matters of policy. They sometimes find it effective first to initiate a relationship with the Bank and through that relationship to forge a strategic link with the government in question.

Finally, some NGOs seek to change Bank policies and approaches. International environmental and development lobbyists have shifted their attention toward the Bank because of its influence on development strategies. They want their views to be considered and reflected in the Bank's work across the development world. Many of these NGOs are critical of the Bank. While in the past they typically viewed multinational corporations and colonialism as the primary sources of developing countries' exploitation, now they describe the Bank as using structural adjustment to coopt developing countries into a global marketplace that serves the world's wealthy, overlooks the needs of the poor, and damages the environment.

2. Operational Links with NGOs

Working with NGOs: A Practical Guide to World Bank-NGO Operational Collaboration (produced by the NGO Group) describes many examples of Bank-NGO partnership in practice, as do successive years' Annual NGO Progress Reports. These documents conclude that there has been a rapid expansion in operational collaboration, and that it is good business practice for Bank staff to work closely with experienced NGOs-especially developing countries NGOs-and CBOs that have intimate knowledge of development issues and who can help further the Bank's concern to strengthen participatory development. This section summarizes the Bank's experience in collaborating with NGOs.

Bank Experience -with NGOs

Working with the Bank, NGOs have helped introduce participatory approaches, strengthened transparency and accountability at the grass-toots level, improved the efficiency of service delivery, ensured better targeting of project benefits to the poor, and piloted innovations. By working with carefully selected NGOs, the Bank has often been able to help governments better use the skills and experience of NGOs and has contributed to increasing mutual confidence. The Bank has developed operational links at three levels: the economic and sector work level, the country

level, and the project level.

Economic and Sector Work Level. A 1995 analysis of economic and sector work (ESW) by the Operations Policy Department (OPR) demonstrated the importance of participation by governments and other stakeholders in fostering local ownership as a precondition of successful Bank-financed projects. Participatory approaches have a particularly important role in analysing the needs and concerns of diverse vulnerable groups, determining the likely or appropriate degree of community involvement, and disseminating ESW to ensure broad political support for development activities, better identification of gainers and losers, and improved design of compensation policies. ESW task managers are increasingly balancing more traditional quantitative analysis with qualitative research methods in order to assess the perceptions of local populations. Many NGOs are ideal partners in such research because they either are skilled in participatory approaches or have broad contacts at the grassroots level. Beneficiary assessments and participatory rural appraisal techniques have greatly strengthened many poverty assessments (see "Participation in Poverty Assessments," OPRPG, 1994); NGOs have contributed to women-in-development assessments (e.g., in Morocco); and NGOs have frequently helped identify local people's usufruct needs in the development of forest sector strategies. It has often proved useful to include an experienced NGO consultant on an ESW mission: with the help of such specialists, a CEM mission to Zimbabwe was able to gain insights into poor people's concerns regarding cost recovery in the health service, and a mission considering poverty and adjustment in Mongolia was better able to appreciate the heterogeneity of the poor. Even when NGOs are not formally involved as consultants or researchers, their advice and experience are often invaluable: for example, interested NGOs added important insights to both the Madagascar and Uganda poverty assessments.

Country Level. The Bank has long played a special role among donors in leading the policy dialogue with governments. A powerful trend of the 1990s has been the increasing importance of civil society in overall policy formulation throughout the developing world and transition economies. This phenomenon is important for the Bank. Experienced NGOs, recognising importance of sound country strategies, are increasingly involved in discussions of development strategy, especially in the areas of poverty and the environment. The Bank is uniquely placed to promote this involvement. For example, in Mali, the Bank, the government, and NGOs jointly organized a major workshop on strategies for reducing hunger (in follow-up to the Bank's "Overcoming Global Hunger" Conference of December 1993) in which the Prime Minister and other government ministers agreed to launch a major new program of food security together with NGOs. In Bangladesh, NGO representatives have been included in a high-level working group on poverty, and in Zambia and Ghana, NGOs have been involved in participatory poverty assessments and thus have been prominent in the discussions between government and donors about poverty strategies. In a number of countries, NGOs have been involved in debating national Environmental Action Plans.

Project Level. The involvement of NGOs can be sought at any point in the project cycle. The Participation and NGO Group (in PSP) is now attempting to evaluate Bank staff members' experience in this regard. It is clear that staff who have involved NGOs in past projects are most likely to plan NGO involvement in new ones-an indication that the outcomes are generally regarded as positive.

At the identification and design stage, NGOs may be involved in assessing environmental or social impacts, organising public consultations, advising on aspects of project design (such as service users' associations), and helping communities articulate their concerns about or desires for an upcoming project. This involvement can help staff ensure that the project is tailored to the needs of local people and avoids potential social or environmental problems. For example, working with developing country NGOs and CBOs has enabled planners for Pakistan's Ghazì-Barotha dam to minimize resettlement and environmental problems and, together with affected communities, sensitively design mitigation measures.

NGOs are most commonly involved in projects during implementation. NGOs with local knowledge may be contracted to deliver project services (such as family planning services within population projects), to effect the required mobilisation of communities (e.g., in immunisation programs), or to manage project components. For example, in the Burkina Faso Population and AIDS Control Project, NGOs played a key role in reaching high-risk populations. NGOs can also be financial intermediaries, as in many social funds and social action programs. NGOs may be uniquely placed to provide training: for example, NGOs are working with indigenous people in natural resources projects in Amazon, in microenterprise development for women in the WEMTOP Program, and in improving the capacity of civil servants to work with rural communities in Ghana.

Though NGOs are rarely involved formally in monitoring and evaluation (the midterm review of the Fourth Livestock Development Project in Ethiopia and the impact evaluation of three transmigration projects in Indonesia ate some examples), it is increasingly common for Bank supervision missions to consult with NGOs on the ground. This has been the case, for example, with many projects involving large-scale resettlement. NGOs may be involved as project partners in other ways, such as cofinancing; for example, Rotary International funded a polio vaccine plant within a Bank-financed polio eradication project in China.

NGO Strengths

In working with NGOs, the Bank is able to draw on several areas of strength that can have a great impact on Bank work:

(a) *Innovation and Piloting:* The FONCODES project in Peru has demonstrated how an effective social fund can be built upon a model demonstrated by a consortium of national NGOs; and in Yatenga, Burkina Faso, Oxfam's program of "water harvesting" has served as a pilot for Bank operations in soil and water conservation throughout the Sahel.

(b) *Local Accountability:* NGO involvement in government health programs has ensured that health workers are not abusing their positions; for example, in Uganda some bilaterals chose to channel aid through NGOs to reduce under-the-counter sab of drugs.

(c) *Responsiveness:* NGOs can often help ensure that projects are responsive by organising consultations with affected communities and monitoring.

(d) *Participation:* NGOs can act as interlocutors between project authorities and communities. For example, Orangi in Karachi implemented a widespread sewerage project that was more effective, more sustainable, and considerably cheaper than an equivalent public utility project because it engaged local people in managing the project and in cleaning their neighbourhood.

(e) *Sustainability:* NGOs, as structures that are not linked to government, can provide continuity where governments are weak and prone to rapid change.

Not all NGOs have such strengths, however, and collaboration with NGOs is not successful in all projects or relevant to all sectors. Some NGOs have not been able to deliver what was hoped for, and irreconcilable differences in approach have led to collaboration being discontinued (e.g., in an agricultural credit program in Niger, CARE did not agree with the Bank's insistence on certain eligibility restrictions). Bank staff have found that establishing clear objectives and procedures for collaboration at the outset is as important as careful NGO selection.

3. Policy Dialogue with NGOs

The aspect of NGO relations that has proved most difficult for the Bank has been interaction on matters of development policy. While advocacy NGOs have tended to dominate the dialogue, and some NGO lobbyists have made fierce attacks on the Bank, many operational NGOs have joined in the criticism. This pressure has concentrated on three operational areas:

(a) *structural adjustment,* its social and environmental costs, and what is perceived as a "structural adjustment paradigm" that many

NGOs believe dominates Bank work; a related issue is the need for debt relief, especially on multilateral debt;

(b) *environmentally sustainable development,* including forestry policies, energy production and efficiency, conservation of natural habitats, environmental assessments, Environmental Action Plans, the Bank's contribution to "Agenda 21," and the workings of the GEF; and

(c) social policy, including popular participation, gender, equity, direct poverty reduction (human resource operations, participatory poverty assessments, the poverty progress report, hunger reduction programs), microcredit, resettlement, indigenous peoples, and human rights.

In addition, there has been pressure for major institucional reforms to the Bank's governance, specifically the following:

(a) transparency: expanding the disclosure policy and strengthening its implementation; translating basic project documents into local languages and key Operational Policies into major languages; active dissemination of information within developing countries;

(b) *accountability:* monitoring the Bank's response to issues raised by the Task Force on Portfolio Management, the MDB Task Force and the Quality Assurance Group; developing improved indicators of development impact; changing the culture of the Bank and its reward system to emphasise delivery of stated Bank priorities; and

(c) *participation:* ensuring that the politically weak have a voice in Bank-financed operations, through Bank and government consultations with affected communities and appeals to the Inspection Panel; ensuring the right of project-affected people to receive just compensation; recognising the importance of stakeholder participation in development decisions as well as implementation; and focusing greater Bank attention on human rights considerations.

The Bank's disclosure policy, the program of action on participation, and the establishment of the Inspection Panel all illustrate that NGOs have provided impetus to the Bank's reform agenda. They also reveal that the Bank has the capacity to respond to external concerns. The Bank's disclosure policy, which offers substantial information to the public, goes considerably further than do most other development agencies, governmental bodies, and indeed most NGOs; and the Inspection Panel sets a precedent among international organisations. The Bank's increasing work on governance issues is also noteworthy but has received less attention from Bank critics.

4. Key Issues and Opportunists

Existing policies already allow considerable opportunities for partnership with NGOs. This section describes the key issues the Bank faces in realising the full potential of that partnership.

NGO *Selection Process*

In most countries there are many NGOs, but the Bank cannot interact with all of them -it needs to be selective. To select NGOs that are best placed to help it accomplish its work, the Bank can often rely on the NGO community itself—for example, on networks, consortia, and the recommendations of proven partners. The Bank also needs to build its own capacity to evaluate NGOs, especially in the resident missions. The most important selection criteria are as follows:

(a) *Skill and capacity:* which NGOs have the necessary sectoral, social, or geographic expertise, can undertake the scale of operation envisaged, and have a proven track record, in particular of working with poor citizens? (NB: large scale does not necessarily make an NGO a desirable partner, often the reverse. But the resources, staff and management must be compatible with the task at hand).

(b) *Governance:* which NGOs are well-managed and reliable, have well-developed systems of accountability and transparency, are not aligned to a political party, and are free of nepotism ?

(c) *Legitimacy and credibility:* which NGOs are acceptable to government and other partners, have the necessary legal status, and have mechanisms and commitment to ensure real

representation of local communities and maximum delegation of decision-making to community level?

(d) *Shared interests:* the Bank should not assume that NGOs will readily make time and resources available for collaboration.

• NGOs have their own agendas and plans. In the selection process, the Bank must thus be mindful that collaboration be seen as a mutually beneficial opportunity to work together.

Government involvement

If development initiatives are to be sustained, governments must be fully involved in collaborative partnerships with NGOs. By fostering a "trialogue" among the Bank, the government, and NGOs, staff have often helped bring about substantial collaboration between the public and NGO sectors. In Uganda, for example, a Bank study of the NGO sector revealed many aspects of the operating environment that hampered the contribution of NGOs and caused mistrust between them and the government. This study, and subsequent workshops on the findings, helped the government strengthen its relations with NGOs. In the Philippines, the promotion of NGO-government partnership at the municipal level has been an important feature of a health program.

Flexibility in Contracts and Procurement

Strict interpretations of business practices and time-consuming internal Bank reviews are likely to hamper creative partnerships with NGOs. Staff need to be informed about, and to use, the considerable flexibility the system allows. For example, there are simpler procurement rules to ensure more effective community participation (see Working with NGOs: A Practical Guide to Operational Collaboration Between the World Bank and NGOs, March 1995; and "Procurement and Disbursement," a paper prepared for the Workshop on Participatory Development, May 1994). In 1994-95, OPR organized a task force of staff, and experienced NGOs to study the Bank's business practices and recommend ways to facilitate Bank-NGO collaboration. The work of this task force (which included assisting in the preparation of "Working with NGOs" and revising the old Operational Directive on NGOs) is now concluded.

Better Listening

By changing Bank policies, the Bank has acknowledged the validity of some NGO criticism. The Bank needs to be less defensive, more open to issues that NGOs raise, and more active in seeking the guidance of NGOs with relevant experience. For example, the Bank has held productive consultations with NGOs in drafting a number of policies particularly in the environmental and social policy arenas (such as forest policy, energy, resettlement, indigenous peoples, environmental assessment and water policy). It has become recognized as good practice in the drafting of policies for the departments concerned to counsel the advice and comments of relevant specialists outside the Bank (as well as Bank specialists) before presenting the draft policy to the Board. When there is relevant expertise within the NGO community, special consultations are often warranted.

NGOs may also play an important role in helping to ensure that agreed policy is adequately implemented. For example, an informal Bank-NGO working group on disclosure has greatly helped the Bank identify ways of strengthening the implementation of the information disclosure policy.

Differences among Bank Members

The emphasis on participation, public consultation, and constructive dialogue with NGOs and critics is not always compatible with the requirements of confidentiality, achievement of specified development objectives with the requisite government ownership, and maintenance of a close relationship with borrowing governments. Some borrowers, who see that NGOs often have access to Bank information and top managers, may see the Bank as

more concerned about the views and interests of NGOs (particularly those in Washington) than their own. Often they resent advocacy NGOs, whom they see as accountable to no one (other than to their Boards or Sunders), for seeking to impose on borrowers the same standards expected in Part I countries -standards that not all NGOs adhere to themselves, and that may not be compatible with borrowers' individual historical and cultural characteristics. Some borrowing governments may also resent the fact that some Part I governments increasingly consult NGOs and rely on NGO information; some borrowing governments tend to think the Bank and its members are giving too much attention to discussing policies and projects with NGOs.

5. Current Priorities

The practice of working with NGOs has been going on for many years, and the priorities and strategy have remained the same, but the building of partnerships has very much increased, particularly over the past 12 months. The FY95 Progress Report, which comprises the second half of this paper, only captures the very beginning of this period. Mr. Wolfensohn has stressed constructive dialogue and cooperation with all stakeholders in civil society and has interacted extensively himself with NGOs both at headquarters and during his travels.

a. NGO Relations at the Field Level

A particularly important development has been the strengthening of Bank relations within developing countries. Three factors are important in this. Firstly, many Resident Missions have appointed specialist staff for NGO liaison and social analysis. The first such appointments were made in India and Indonesia and over the last 18 months a further 30 such staff have been appointed (in 10 out of 11 LAC missions, in 17 out of 28 Africa missions, in Pakistan, Bulgaria, and Romania). In total, therefore, 32 out of the Bank's 71 Resident Missions now have NGO liaison officers. Secondly, strong efforts have been made, particularly in countries where there is an NGO specialist in the Resident Mission, to develop systematic dialogue with the local NGO community, to broker new working partnerships, and to listen more attentively to their views and concerns. And thirdly, intensive efforts have been made in many countries to improve the dissemination of information to NGOs and the broader civil society. For example, a Caribbean Public Information Centre has been established in Jamaica to ensure that the availability of Bank information is similar to that in Washington (see Part II, page 28). In Indonesia, arrangements have been made with six NGOs or academic institutions for the dissemination of Bank information in the major islands of that country. And various Resident Missions are now arranging for important ESW and project documents to be translated into local languages.

b. Dialogue on Policy Issues with NGOs

There has been a parallel strengthening of many central vice-presidency units' relations (CVPUs) with NGOs. ESD, for example, has developed bi-monthly meetings with major US-based NGOs and regular interactions with NGOs elsewhere. The Bank now routinely holds international consultations with NGOs and other specialists during the preparation of major policy documents (such as the WDR and papers submitted to UN summits). An external Gender Consultative Group has recently been established and an informal working group of NGOs as well as Bank staff has guided the implementation of the disclosure policy. In addition, the Bank is planning a joint review with an international group of NGOs, under the auspices of the NGO-World Bank Committee to review (together with governments) the social record of structural adjustment in a number of countries, with a view to learning lessons for future applicability. The Bank has also had intensive discussions with NGOs about enhancing its work in the area of participatory development and has discussed with many operational NGOs how participatory approach-

es may be used within the CAS process.

While remaining responsive to its dialogue with Part I NGOs, the Bank is making special efforts to reach out to NGOs in developing countries (national, regional, grass-roots, and local branches of international NGOs) to discuss issues of development policy. The NGO-World Bank Committee has been overhauled to improve its links in developing countries. In the mid-1980s, the committee was a unique forum for dialogue with NGOs on operational and policy matters; now, however, the Bank has other interactions with NGOs, and the committee has needed to become more specific. In addition to dialogue on particular policy issues, such as the IDA-11 replenishment and participatory development, the committee is now playing an important role in guiding the Bank's evolving NGO strategy and helping construct more appropriate forums for policy debate. Bank-NGO meetings, especially those held in the context of the NGO-World Bank Committee, are now being organized by region or subregion, (for example, the recent regional meetings in Accra, Manila and Managua).

c. Strengthening NGOs in Borrowing Countries

The Bank is now putting more emphasis on helping to strengthen the NGO sectors in borrowing countries. In addition to fostering enhanced government-NGO-Bank partnership (and a project under preparation in Mali for combating hunger and poverty is an excellent illustration of this) and expanding the provision of information to civil society, there are three initiatives of note. Firstly, EDI has a number of programs which provide opportunities for NGO capacity building. Secondly, the Consultative Group to assist the Poorest has now been established to provide grant funding to NGOs and other providers of micro-finance services to poor people. Other mechanisms are being considered to enhance Bank financial support for NGOs. And thirdly, a program of work has been initiated to help governments develop a more enabling policy environment for NGOs, Studies of this issue have been initiated in Bangladesh, Indonesia, and West Bank/Gaza. And a major analysis of NGO law is underway in preparation of a handbook on global standards and best practice to assist governments redraft or modify their laws governing NGOs.

In recent years, the Bank has emphasized "good governance" as central to strong and equitable development. NGOs can make an important contribution to good governance by (a) contributing to public sector management; (b) helping governments strengthen the accountability of public agencies; (c) disseminating information to the public, and ensuring that the information is widely understood; (d) helping ensure the equitable application of the rule of law; (e) facilitating public debate on proposed development initiatives and policy formulation; (f) supplementing public services; and (g) helping the public (especially its weaker members) influence the quality, volume, and targeting of government services and benefits.

The role that NGOs play in these activities varies enormously from country to country, depending on the policy environment for NGOs (particularly indigenous NGOs). Therefore, to help create an environment that is conducive to sound development, it is appropriate for the Bank to foster a healthy NGO-government relationship (see Governance: The World Bank's Experience, Washington D.C., 1994, and The State and the Voluntary Sector, HCO Working Paper No. 12, 1994). Desirable aspects of such a relationship would be: (a) there are no arbitrary obstacles to the forming of NGOs; (b) fiscal, registration, and other regulations concerning NGOs are enabling, predictable, and conducive to local philanthropy; (c) NGOs and the public have ready access to information about development plans, and such information is disseminated widely; (d) NGOs are protected by the rule of law; (e) NGOs have full freedom to comment on the workings of state agencies; and (f) governments and donors work in partnership with and perhaps fund NGOs that have demonstrated effectiveness, particularly in reaching the poor.

(To be continued: Part II. Progress in Fiscal Year 1995).

Another role for an **NGO:** financing a who programme rotary international and the eradication of poliomyelitis

by Yves Eeìgbeder *

Most international NGOs associated with the operational activities of UN and other intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and a number of national NGOs, are subsidized by governments and intergovernmental organizations, to varying degrees to carry out work on their behalf.

As noted by Gordenker and Weiss [1], "In 1994 over 10% of public development aid ($8 billion) was channelled through NGOs, surpassing the volume of the combined UN system ($6 billion) without the Washington-based financial institutions. About 25% of US assistance is channelled through NGOs ..."

For example, UNHCR establishes contractual relationships with NGOs: some contracts provide for full financing by the agency. All OECD countries have "cofinancing" agreements, under which the OECD government subsidizes, from 50 to 100%, of the costs of an approved NGO-run project, or allocates a yearly subsidy to one or several NGOs. Cofinancing is also practiced by the European Union: the Union cofinances aid and development projects in developing countries undertaken by NGOs jointly with local partners under certain conditions [2] The major part of the budget of the International Committee of the Red Cross is paid by the Swiss Government.

In a role reversal, Rotary International has appropriated in 1988 $5,331,000 from its PolioPlus fund to the WHO Programme of Eradication of Poliomyelitis. Its PolioPlus programme, initiated in 1985, has allocated $223 million in grants to national polio immunization and eradication programmes in 111 countries.

While this is not a unique example of an NGO financing, in part, an IGO programme, this paper will focus on this particular WHO Programme and Rotary 's contribution to it.

WHO's relations with NGOs

On similar lines to Art. 71 of the UN Charter, the WHO Constitution (Art. 71) authorizes the Organization to "make suitable arrangements for consultation and cooperation with non-governmental organizations and, with the consent of the Government concerned, with national organizations, governmental or non-governmental". The Organization's early interest in this collaboration was shown by the vote of a resolution by the First World Health Assembly in 1948 defining the "Working Principles Governing the Admission of Non-Governmental Organizations into Official Relations with WHO". Its latest revision was approved in 1987. [3]

In order to be admitted into official relations with WHO, the area of competence of the NGO should fall within the purview of WHO and centre on development work in health or health-related fields. The applicant NGO must be international in its structure and/or scope, and free from concerns which are primarily of a commercial or profit-making nature.

The applicant NGOs will have to be "loyalist": they must declare their allegiance to the spirit, purposes and principles of the WHO Constitution and promote the policies, strategies and programmes derived from the decisions of the Organization's governing bodies, and in particular the "Health for all" strategies.

In contrast with the three UN categories for NGOs (I, II and Roster), WHO recognizes only one category of formal relations, known as "official relations". However, first contacts with an NGO frequently take the informal form of exchanges of information and reciprocal participation in technical meetings. When specific joint activities have been identified, collaboration may be taken a stage further by proceeding to a period (usually two years) of working relations entered into by an exchange of letters. An NGO may then apply for admission into official relations with WHO by submitting a structured plan for collaborative activities for a three-year period, agreed upon by the NGO and WHO. The admission decision is taken by the WHO Executive Board, whose Standing Committee on NGOs will review collaboration every three years.

The privileges conferred on NGOs by their relationship with WHO are the following:

(i) the right to appoint a representative to par-

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(1) Thomas G. Weiss and Leon Gordenker, Eds., "Pluralising Global Governance: Analytical Approaches and Dimensions", in NGOs, *the UN, and Global Governance,* Lynne Rienner Publ., Boulder/London 1996, p.25.
(2)Yves Beigbeder, The Role and Status of international *Humanitarian Volunteers and Organizations,* Martinus Nijhoff Publ., Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1991, pp, 29, 58.
(3) WHO Basic Documents, Fortieth edition, 1994, pp.

ticipate, without right of vote, in WHO's meetings and committees, with the right to make a statement at the invitation or with the permission of the meeting chairman;

(ii) access to non-confidential information;

(iii) the right to submit a memorandum to the Director-General, who will determine the nature and scope of the circulation of this document.

As of April 1996, there were 181 NGOs in official relations with WHO. They represent emergency and humanitarian relief organizations, trade and consumer associations, parliamentary and professional medical societies, association of women, young people, the elderly, occupational health specialists and research organizations etc. They cooperate, for example, in emergency relief operations, in training of personnel, workshops on blood safety and epidemiology, as well as education programmes for young surgeons and midwives. Other activities include exchanges on bioethical issues and developments in medical law, the application of the results of research on such subjects as nutrition, human reproduction and the prevention and treatment of accidents. Some monitor the implementation of the International Code of Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes, after taking an active partisan part in the debates and controversies surrounding the adoption of the Code. They may thus mobilize public support in support of WHO policies and programmes, apply pressure on WHO and governments in promoting their associations' interests, as well as provide operational assistance to WHO activities, expert advice, supervision of the implementation of norms and training. They represent the concerns and interests of their constituencies. Their advocacy role should apply to WHO's own objectives and programmes, but it also applies to their organization's own objectives.

The importance of WHO's collaboration with NGOs was underscored by the former Director of the WHO Global Programme on AIDS, Dr. Jonathan Mann, in 1989: "There is an increasing recognition of the power and importance of community-based organizations. These community organizations have often been pioneers, leading the way for more timid or reluctant governments ... In AIDS programmes, there is a direct relationship between the strength, diversity and involvement of community-based and non-governmental organizations and the level of success which can be achieved". [4]

The collaboration achieved by this programme has expanded to other WHO programmes, including the Eradication of Poliomyelitis Programme.

The WHO Poliomyelitis Eradication Programme

WHO created its Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI) in 1974, to immunize the children of the world against diphtheria, measles, poliomyelitis, tetanus, tuberculosis, and whooping cough. EPI's objective was to reduce childhood morbidity and mortality through immunization, and by making the best vaccines available and using them in the most effective manner.

In 1974, coverage for children under one year of age in developing countries was well below five per cent. In 1987, for the first time in history, coverage exceeded 50 % for all vaccines except measles (at 46%). Still, in the same year, in the developing world, some 230,000 children contracted polio.

In 1985, the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) passed a regional resolution to eradicate polio from the Americas by 1990. By 1991, the last clinical case of polio was reported from the region, and the Americas were certified polio-free in 1994. Thus PAHO served as a regional pioneer for global polio eradication by identifying and implementing effective strategies, and by mobilizing Member States and a coalition of donors.

In 1988, the World Health Assembly established the goal of eradicating polio by the year 2000. This goal was also endorsed in 1990 by the World Summit for Children, attended by leaders of more than 150 countries, UN

(4) WHO Doc. GPA/GMC(2)/89.5,4 December 1989.

agencies and NGOs.

In 1990, over 70% of the world's children under one year of age were covered by immunisation against vaccine-preventable diseases. Immunization reached 74% for a third dose of polio vaccine for children under one year of age. It was estimated that over 480 000 cases of polio were being prevented each year with current levels of coverage of polio vaccine. [5]

In 1992, progress toward the eradication goal was significant. Areas with a zero or low incidence of polio now included countries in Northern and Southern Africa and the Arabian Gulf. No polio cases were reported from the Western Hemisphere, and no endemic areas were identified in Western Europe. Globally, however, the progressive decline in incidence from 1988 to 1991 did not continue in 1992, when reported incidence increased by 6% over the previous year. The source of the problem appeared to be in the South-East Asian Region where incidence increased by 40%, although improved surveillance and better reporting may have contributed to the increase; the other five WHO regions reported declines in 1992.

In 1993, the number of reported polio cases fell below 10 000 for the first time and 143 countries were reporting zero cases of polio. Six emerging polio free zones had been identified: the Americas, where eradication was certified in September 1994; Western and Central Europe; North Africa; the Middle East and the Arabian Peninsula; and the Western Pacific. Significant progress was achieved in China where mote than 80 million children were immunized in the first National Immunization Day in the winter of 1993-1994. As a result, only 149 cases of Acute Flaccid Paralysis were reported from China for 1994 of which only one was laboratory confirmed.

The priorities for 1995 were: achieving eradication in the Western Pacific region in 1995; activating polio eradication strategies in the countries of the Indian subcontinent, which accounts for two thirds of the worlds polio cases; coordinated, multinational National Immunization Days in contiguous countries of Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East; and advocacy to improve political commitment and raise funds. [6]

(5) WHO Features, No. 127, September 1988, Press Release WHO/37, 20 July

(6) EPI Programme Report 1993" and"... 1994", Section 4.5.

WHO Strategies for Polio Eradication

Polio will be considered to have been eradicated when the transmission of wild poliovirus has been interrupted and no wild virus can be found, despite intensive efforts to do so. The virus can be imported and may spread. Polio can be certified as eradicated only when no cases have been reported worldwide for three years.

The strategies recommended by WHO include the following:

- routine immunization, with high levels of coverage in all countries.
- National Immunization Days in all polio endemic countries for a period of several years.
- intensive surveillance for acute flaccid paralysis using a global network of certified virology laboratories.
- mopping-up immunization in the final, localized reservoirs of wild poliovirus transmission.

According to WHO specialists, polio eradication is feasible because there is no natural animal reservoir or long term carrier state of poliovirus, and the virus cannot easily persist in tropical environments. In addition, there is an effective, low cost, oral polio vaccine that provides intestinal and humoral immunity, and can interrupt circulation of the virus. There are however two factors that make polio eradication challenging. First, there is a high inapparent infection rate: less than 1% of poliovirus infections result in paralysis. Secondly, this paralysis may be clinically indistinguishable from other infections. These factors make laboratory confirmation by virus isolation necessary for definitive diagnosis of polio.

Other obstacles include: shortage of funds for vaccine, laboratories, logistics and personnel; and, in some countries, insufficient political commitment, falling immunization coverage and the damaging effect of political unrest or civil war.

WHO asserts that the long term benefits of polio eradication far outweigh the short term costs. When the goal is achieved, no child will be paralyzed or killed by the crippling and

painful disease. Another benefit is the reinforcement of health care delivery. The programme strengthens primary health care by expanding immunization and other preventive services, increasing public awareness of health services available, providing health education, better control of other diseases of public health importance and improving disease surveillance. The global laboratory network established by WHO to undertake the task of poliovirus surveillance can be used for other important diseases. The mass campaign provides an opportunity to provide other vaccines and micro-nutrients.

The principal donors to the EPI in the period 1988-1994 were the governments of Denmark, Netherlands, USA, Australia, Japan, Norway, Finland, Sweden, UK, Canada, United Arab Emirates, China, Italy, Malaysia and Austria, UNDP and UNICEF. Among the foundations, Rotary International provided the same amount in financial contributions as the US government, while the Rockefeller Foundation's contribution almost equalled that of Sweden.

Recognizing the remaining challenge, six global public health agencies and NGOs active in child immunization have recently joined together to form the Polio Eradication Network (PEN). It is composed of WHO, UNICEF, the Pan American Health Organization, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Task Force for Child Survival and Development, and Rotary International.

WHO provides the global technical leadership. UNICEF is the major provider of vaccines and immunization equipment: it purchases the oral polio vaccine for Rotary's PolioPlus. UNICEF advocates globally for the programme, plays a key role in social mobilization, and provides operational support in countries. CDC, a US government agency, provides technical, laboratory and programmatic assistance, as well as funds.

Rotary International began its PolioPlus programme in 1985. By 1995, out of a fund of $248 million, the Rotary Foundation had allocated $223 million in PolioPlus grants to immunization and eradication efforts in 111 countries. [7]

(7) Doc. WHO/GPV/95.1, p.81, other documentation from the WHO EPI in the Global Programme on Vaccines and Immunization, - and Fact sheet from Rotary International, "PolioPlus". (8) Factual information on Rotary International and PolioPlus is based on its Fact sheets PR12-EN (9/94), PR52 (7/95), Rotary Foundation Polio-Plus Program, *Annual Report on Operations, 1993-94* and "...1994-95", -and correspondence with Rotary's officials in Zurich and Evanston.

4. What is Rotary International

The first Rotary Club was created in Chicago on 23 February 1905. In 1995, Rotary International is a service club organization of close to 1,2 million business and professional men and women, associating more than 27,000 Rotary Clubs in 154 countries. Its budget for 1995-1996 is $93.7 million, of which S31.3 million is allocated for PolioPlus. [8]

The organization is a non-political and non-sectarian international NGO. Rotarians give service on a voluntary basis. Each club determines its own service activities. Currently, Rotary International encourages clubs to focus community activities on fighting hunger, environmental concerns, illiteracy, drug abuse prevention, helping youth and the elderly, and childhood immunization.

One of its four "objects" or goals is "the advancement of international understanding, goodwill and peace through a world fellowship of business and professional persons united in the ideal of service". One of its four "avenues of service" concerns international service: "helping to fulfill educational and humanitarian needs beyond the boundaries of their own countries, usually by participating in the many international programs of Rotary International and the Rotary Foundation".

The Rotary Foundation provides humanitarian awards and grants in conjunction with Rotary club and district international service activities. It is supported by voluntary contributions from Rotarians and friends of Rotary. All grants from the Foundation are international in nature: at least two different Rotary clubs or districts from different countries must participate in all Foundation endeavours. Total contributions for 1994-1995 were $61.7 million. In the 1993 ranking of the top US-based charitable organizations, the Rotary Foundation ranked as the 6th lowest in administrative costs as a percentage of total revenue.

Rotary's PolioPlus

Rotary International's involvement in polio eradication began modestly with support

to the Philippines national immunization program, 1979-1980. The first project under the Rotary Foundation's new Health, Hunger and Humanity program was the provision of polio vaccine to some six million children in that country.

Following consultations with such experts as Dr. Albert Sabin, and officials at the Pan American Health Organization, WHO and UNICEF, Rotary's support evolved.

Since its early days, Rotary had worked to improve the quality of life for people with disabilities. It was the catalyst for the formation of national organizations for crippled children first in the US, then in numerous other countries . It was a natural extension of that tradition for Rotary to work to prevent disability by creating a world free of polio. It was also clear that this vision could not be endorsed without the political and technical endorsement of WHO, and without the collaboration of WHO and UNICEF.

In January 1985, Rotary was granted provisional consultative status with WHO. In February, the PolioPlus Program was announced. Beginning with a commitment to raise $120 million to help control polio, Rotarians raised the bulk of funds, $248 million, in a 1986-1988 fund-raising campaign. Contributions came from Rotarians, other individuals, firms, foundations and government grants,

The programme mobilized tens of thousands of volunteers to assist in massive immunization campaigns around the world. For instance, prior to the eradication of polio in the Americas, Rotarians in Peru served as home visitors, vaccinators, drivers, meal preparers, data analysts and publicists. Rotarians also secured some $440,000 worth in advertising, transportation, supplies, posters and print and broadcast messages for national immunization days. This included mobilizing 11,000 volunteers, 1,000 vehicles, generating mass media support and visiting 10,000 vaccination posts. In Chile, Rotarians printed and distributed 60,000 promotional posters, 2 million stickers with vaccination schedules and 1,500 manuals. They donated cold-chain equipment totalling $150,000 including 1,250 thermoses, 3,000 thermometers, 115 refrigerators, 19 freezers and 100 boxes of vaccine with ice packs.

Rotary claims that, to a large extent, the creation of PolioPlus was the catalyst for the World Health Assembly adoption of the goal of global polio eradication by the year 2000.

In November 1988, at WHO's request, the trustees of the Rotary Foundation agreed to provide funding for the immediate recruitment of six core professional staff for the period 1989-1994 who would help countries to develop and strengthen those technical capacities which would be required to achieve the eradication goal. Such personnel could provide more guidance to Rotarians in various countries on how they could focus their efforts and those of the rest of the private sector in the most effective ways. $5,331,000 was appropriated from the PolioPlus fund for this purpose.

In June 1991, a WHO meeting examined the possibilities for practical improvements in the oral polio vaccine. The meeting concluded that the best alternative was to increase the vaccine's heat stability, specifically to produce a vaccine which would maintain its potency for one week in temperatures of 45 degrees Celsius. It was anticipated that the laboratory research phase of this project would cost approximately $450,000. $200,000 were invested by the US government. In October 1991, the Rotary trustees made a PolioPlus grant of $250,000 for a one-year collaborative research project to produce a thermostable oral polio vaccine.

Rotary has met its original PolioPlus goal of providing the vaccine necessary for up to five consecutive years to any developing country requesting such assistance. Nearly 100 countries received such assistance. Funds currently allocated by the trustees will provide at least three doses of oral polio vaccine to some 500 million infants. Rotary resources will be focused in three main areas: limited vaccine grants, surveillance and advocacy for polio eradication.

An assessment

Rotary's collaboration with WHO and other IGOs and NGOs in the WHO

Poliomyelitis Eradication Programme is not limited to its direct, limited financial support to WHO. Its main contribution is the support of this influential NGO to a global programme and its capacity to mobilize funds and volunteers in many countries. In view of the limited and shrinking resources of WHO and other UN organizations, and governments' fatigue, the resources provided by NGOs and by the private sector are more than welcome: they are necessary.

This voluntary and generous assistance provided by a US-based NGO to a UN agency contrasts with the US Congress' continued delinquency in withholding payments of the US statutory contributions to the regular budgets of UN organizations. Rotary's financial and other support to a UN agency programme also contrasts with the generally negative assessment of US media of UN organizations' programmes and performance.

For WHO, the interest of the additional financial contribution is obvious. Although a relatively- new development for the Organization, there is little risk that this contribution by a US-based NGO may be criticized by Member States as "politicized", in view of the general attitude of the US.

For Rotary, this campaign associates the NGO to a broad international effort of a humanitarian character. The campaign has a solid technical base, a well-defined strategy, a precise and reachable objective and a well-argued economic rationale, on lines similar to the successful smallpox eradication campaign. The illness is of global interest, as the populations of North and South countries are at risk. Rotary's contribution to the campaign is not only a "good deed" but also a public relations effort enhancing its public national and international ¡mage. Rotary benefits from its cooperation with WHO by the technical approval given to its polio eradication programme and, more generally, by the international legitimacy bestowed by the UN agency to the US Foundation.

In compensation for its contribution under its PolioPlus programme, Rotary demands public recognition from the governments concerned. In 1995, the Trustees agreed "that all PolioPlus grants shall be conditioned on an acceptable plan of government acknowledgement and public recognition to Rotary and no funds shall be released until a specific, detailed plan for government acknowledgement and public recognition of The Rotary Foundation of Rotary International as the donor of the grant is received and determined by the Chairman of the Trustees to be acceptable". 9

Other financial contributions by NGOs

The following foundations contributed to the WHO Voluntary Fund for Health Promotion, created in 1960, for the period from 1960 up to 31 December 1993: [10]

- Carnegie Corporation on New York $ 3,630,900
- Damien Foundation, Belgium $ 2,353,331
- Edna McConnell Clark Foundation $ 2,242,500
- Ford Foundation $ 1,107,500
- John D. and Catherine T. Macatthur Foundation $ 5,920,000
- Rockefeller Foundation $11,316,217

NGOs contributed a total of $29.3 million for UNICEF-assisted programmes in 1994, of which Rotary International provided about one third. Other important financial contributors included NGO groups in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, as well as the Bernard Van Leer Foundation, Kiwanis International and Redd Barna (Norwegian Save the Children). [11]

Under what conditions ? What are the limits ?

WHO may accept financial contributions from NGOs under the same conditions which apply to the admission of NGOs into official relations with the Organization: allegiance to WHO's objectives and policies, acceptance of its role as "directing and coordinating authority" in international public health

(9) The Rotary Foundation **of Ro**tary International, **PolioPlus** Program, *Annual Report on Operations, 1994-95*, **p.4**
(10)WHO Doc. A47/19 Add.1, 11 April 1994, **Annex.**
(11) UNICEF **"Annual Report 1995", p.72.**

work, acceptance of its technical guidance and assessment. The NGO should have an international scope, a public health orientation and non-profit making activities.

While this is not specified in the WHO "Principles", it would be advisable that the NGO had a "neutral" profile in national and/or international politics, and an internationally - recognized humanitarian experience and prestige. WHO should reject offers of funds from organizations whose resources have attracted controversial and negative reports.

NGOs' financial contributions to IGOs could be the small beginning of a much needed "third resource" for UN organizations, besides the statutory and voluntary contributions of Member States. However, this would be essentially a symbolical contribution, rather than a significant one, to most IGOs budgets: WHO's regular budget for 1996-1997 amounts to more than $922 million.

The Director-General of WHO, Dr. H. Nakajima, has recently recognized the need for the Organization to diversify its alliances: "WHO must open itself up to alt sectors of society, including nongovernmental organizations and the private sector. These new partners will bring new challenges, but by meeting them we can enhance significantly our ability to mobilize social, political and therefore financial support for health development and international health cooperation." [12]

The main benefit of NGOs' involvement in WHO programmes is the participation of the ultimate clients of IGOs, the people, through their associations: a welcome involvement of the "civil society" into international humanitarian cooperation and assistance.

(12) WHO Press Release WHO/3, 15 January 1996.

The view of civil society on the future after Lomé IV

This was the subject of a conference which took place in Maastricht from 12-14 June 1996, under the auspices of the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM). It brought together participants from ACP countries and Europe, including representatives of civil society (NGOs, the private sector, etc.). Four major topics were addressed:

- How can a new EVIACP commercial relationship be constructed?

There was agreement that some form of preferential trade regime should continue after 2000. Some participants stressed the need to promote "fair trade", which would contribute not only to growth but also to development. The impact of individual trade preferences is not always clear-cut, but obviously there cannot be a single solution covering all problems in all ACP countries. An analysis of negative constraints demonstrated the difficulties involved in reconciling the rules of the Lomé Convention and those of the world Trade Organisation.

- How can the private sector become involved in development?

The most important aspect of this topic is knowing how to create a favourable and business-friendly environment which will enable the private sector to play its part - and the role the European Union could play in this process. The private sector was defined as both formal and informal, encompassing large, medium and small enterprises, whether local or foreign. The importance of a strong local private sector in guaranteeing long-term stability was particularly emphasised. In this respect, the view was expressed chat the role of the state and its relationship with the European Commission should be redefined. There was also a call for time to be set aside time for effective dialogue, and to create the space for a partnership between the public and private sectors. It was felt that the role of Economic and Social Councils should be expanded and specified more clearly. As for the specific issue of privatisation, the point was made that this should not be seen as a panacea and that it should be approached on a country-by-country basis.

As regards current instruments, it was noted that their objective is essentially to meet public-sector requirements. The role of the Centre for the Development of Industry (GDI) attracted some criticism. Speakers felt that the private sector should be more involved in the preparation and implementation of cooperation programmes with the European Community. Direct financial support to the private sector was seen as desirable, including backing from the European Investment Bank.

- What partnership?

The partnership concept was seen to have been eroded over the past two decades, with the pretext of efficiency resulting in a more paternalistic approach. Mechanisms needed to be found to enable EU priorities and the prerogatives of ACP countries to be reconciled. Reference was made to the political nature of the origin of the partnership and the need to find a new political raison d'être for this type of relationship. The problems of cohesion within the ACP group and its relations with the EU were also raised, and there was a discussion about the possibility of giving the Convention a regional character - although a number of speakers expressed reservations about this.

On the European side, two lacunae emerged, namely coordination between donors, and consistency between Lomé and other Community policies (including relationships with the Bretton Woods institutions).

In addition to che principle of partnership, some participants were keen to stress the motives of solidarity and common interest that lay behind cooperation. It was not simply a matter of "negative" interdependence. The appropriateness of the term "partnership" was questioned, if this was only to mean financial and technical cooperation. The politicisation of Lomé appears to be on the agenda, involving a move from the current partnership to a genuine "contractual approach" through political dialogue.

As for the role of partnership in cooperation policy management, it was felt essential that civil society and the private sector be involved. There was also a discussion of the debt problem.

- How can financial and technical cooperation be improved?

As usual, reference was made to the need to simplify and differentiate management of Lomé Convention instruments, particularly in the context of che programming process. As regards the role of non-state actors, a cautious approach was recommended. Finally, new instruments were called for to prevent conflict.

- Conclusions

This conference, coming after several others of che same type, was characterised essentially by private sector and NGO calls for greater participation in Community cooperation policy. Moreover, the need for "politicisation" of the Lomé policy, shifting from

purely financial and technical aid to a genuine cooperation contract, seems to have attracted che support of all participants. These questions are sure to figure in the "Green Paper" on "Lomé after 2000", which the European Commission plans to publish before the end of 1996.

Dominique David
(The Courier n° 159 - September-October 1996)

Why Nonprofits? Discussions on Microcredit Programs - Observations from the ISTR Meeting in Mexico City

Microcredit programs as promising tools for economi c and social development was the theme for several paper sessions at the ISTR Second International Conference. Microcredit organizations are a rapidly growing organizational form, designed to meet the economic development needs of small or micro business owners. While these organizations take a variety of forms from loosely arranged peer lending groups to large, formalized internacional organizations, they share commonalties. Microcredit organizations make small or "micro" business loans, usually at a competitive interest rate, to those who do not have access to traditional financial institutions. They often require borrowers to join "lending circles", and are intermediary nonprofit organizations with a large sum of money (usually from government, foundations, or banks) chat they distribute in relatively small amounts to individual borrowers. This institutional form matured in less developed countries and now has been imported to more developed parts of the world such as Western European countries and the United States.

Here we have nonprofit organizations providing a service (i.e., lending) that we traditionally associate with banks. This situation brings us to a recurring question: Why nonprofits? Three case studies provide very different answers. Krishna Kothai from Karnataka, India described an arrangement in India. The National Bank for Agricultural and Rural Development funds public sector banks which in turn fund NGOs. These NGOs mobilize local self-help groups. The NGO will usually loan three times the amount a self-help group has saved. These savings are considered evidence of a group having "saving capacity". Why this arrangement? The public sector bank will loan money to NGOs, but not to self-help groups. In fact, to the public sector banks, the self-help groups have no legal standing. The informal structure of che self-help group and the lack of a relationship to the bank give che self-help groups freedom to use the money however they want. They might use the money to raise a crop, buy a water pump, or even to pay for a daughter's dowry. The group decision making and peer support ensure a high repaymenr rate.

Arthur Williamson discussed the complicated situation of Northern Ireland. He hopes to see microcredit organizations established there with financial support from the European Union. What form will these organizations take? The current policy emphasis of the European Union emphasizes area based-partnerships between public authorities, Third Sector locally based community organizations, and business. Thus, a rnicrocredit organization in Northern Ireland should be composed of elected officials, nonprofit community-based organizations, business representatives, and other local actors. However, this situation is complicated by several factors. The British government wants all money from Brussels to flow through them, the NGOs say that the money must come to them directly, and local partnerships have a potential dark side because of the influence of local paramilitary organizations. Here the key factors in determining organizational form are the current policy emphasis of the EU (who after all are providing the money), and local and national power struggles.

Finally, the United States has experienced a phenomenal growth in microcredit nonprofit organizations. This growth has been fueled by the Small Business Administration microloan program which provides funding to over 100 programs. In the United States, banks rarely make microbusiness loans because it is not worth their trouble. They have to do the same paperwork for a $50,000 loan as for a $4,000 to $5,000 - the start-up needs for a typical small business. Also, using nonprofits as intermediary organizations for lending is consistent with other SBA progams and with the current political climate which emphasizes less government and more local, non profit programs.

In short, for these three countries we see a variety of reasons for choosing the nonprofit organizational form for assistance in economic dev elopment through microcredit. These reasons range from need for informality to maintain legality of banks, policy emphasis of a granting institution, concern over distribution of power, and profit concerns.

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(Inside, ISTR, Fall 1996*)*

NGOs back organic farming at UN food summit

The world's non-governmental organisations (NGOs) recognised the importance of organic farming in their presentation to the linked Nations' summit on food security held in Rome in November 1996.

The NGO forum, which represented 1200 organisations from 80 countries, and included International Federation or Organic Movements representatives, was given four minutes to make a statement to the summit.

Agriculture must no longer rely on nonrenewable resources, and policies favouring organic production should be adopted so that agrochemicals could be reduced or eliminated, they said.

Governments must be enabled to feed their own people first, and their role should be strengthened. Family farmers needed secure land tenure, women farmers needed recognition and support, and resources needed to be shifted in favour of local food suppliers and systems. And their declaration echoed the Soil Association's Counting the Cost of Industrial Agriculture Campaign, calling for the true environmental and social costs of industrial agriculture to be included in the price of food.

(Living Earth, N° 193 Jan 1997)

European Commission calls for more access to national courts for NGOs

The implementation of EU environmental legislation in the Member States is not satisfactory and must be improved. Unless we meet this challenge, not only will we be damaging the environment but we shall lose the confidence of EU citizens, said Environment Commissioner Ritt Bjerregaard on presenting a communication on new proposals aimed at improving implementation of EU law. In 1995 alone, the European Commission registered 265 Member States' breaches of EU environmental law - 20% of all EU law infringements. For example, the Commission will take action against Germany, France, Italy and Portugal for non-transposition into national law of the Habitats Directive (92/43/ECC) and against Germany for non-transposition of the 1976 directive on dangerous discharges into water. Most EU environmental protection law (some 200 acts) is adopted as directives, giving Member States the freedom to transpose legislation according to their national condition. But environmental problems do not respect national borders and implementation weaknesses risk leaving the environment unprotected. In 1995, Member States notified implementing measures for 91% of the EU's environmental directives, with up to 22 not transposed in some Member States.

The communication includes the question of more access to the national courts for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) concerned with environmental issues. Complaints lodged by individuals or NGOs are often blocked because of difficulties in proving alleged violations resulted in direct or personal harm. The Commission has no police force nor environmental inspectors and so cannot monitor the proper implementation of directives in the field. The communication also proposes guidelines to help Member States in their environmental inspections: COM(96)500 fin.

The Commission proposes setting up criteria for voluntary agreements between industry and public authorities, such as prior consultation of interested parties or a staged approach with intermediate objectives: COM(96)56l.

Mrs Bjerregaard aims to introduce environmental impact assessments before land use plans are adopted, thus extending the scope of Directive 85/337/EEC which only covers the assessment of specific projects: COM(96)511. Eco label: Revision proposal: COM(96)60S.

Towards environmentally sustainable land use: Environmental Advisory Councils from Member States give their views on common agricultural policy (CAP) reform and rural sustainability policy: Free (in EN): Gery Hammersley, English Nature, Northminster House, Peterborough, PE1 IUA, UK, fax (44) 1733 688 34.

European sustainable cities: Cat: CR.97-96-055-EN-C (+ Es.DA.DE.GR.FR.IT.NL.PT.FL. SV), 303 pp., ECU 24

Coordinated study steel-environment: Cat: CG-NA-16.955-EN-C, 422 pp. ECU 46.50.

(Euro-OP News, Winter 1996)

Conflict resolution & NGOs

Non-Governmental organizations (NGOs) have a noteworthy role to play in conflict prevention as well conflict resolution because of their spirit of volunteerism, dedication, knowledge, grass-root communication, openness think globally, act locally and experience of operating within regions of conflict. These NGOs are also in a strong position to influence public and government opinion. Due to some of these agencies' actions the 3rd World countries suspect they have a secret agenda, but by and large majority NGOs silently and effectively help bring about a better understanding and brighter tomorrow for all.

One of the key NGO is International Alert which by December 1995 completed a "Decade of Experience" to pursue peace and resolve conflicts in many parts of the world, Dr. Kumar Rupesinge is its active S.G.

The Muslim World' weekly supports IA's initiative to strengthen links with and among NGOs within the humanitarian, development, human rights, environment and peace sector. Beside this the relationship between NGOs and governments should and could be strengthened so that they can work together to devise complementary approaches to resolving the issues which bring about conflict.

Every nation needs people committed to tackle decline of morals, raise ethical values instead of only material gains, expose social injustices, eleviate trust, resolve tensions, restore equal human eights, strive for welfare society and happy sustainable future,

Khalid Ikramullah Khan,
Editor, *The Muslim World*,
24th August 1996

La francophonie scientifique a désormais son site internet : L'espace scientifique francophone

Ce site présente l'ensemble des activités, programmes et structures du réseau scientifique francophone qui regroupe aujourd'hui 400 établissements, 5.000 équipes de recherche et 50.000 chercheurs et enseignants. Il offre également des outils scientifiques interactifs mis à la disposition des internautes francophones (Revues, banques de données, répertoires Internet...).

Le site a été présenté le 23 mai 1996 au ministre québécois des relations internationales et responsables de la Francophonie, Monsieur Sylvain Simard, en présence des membres du Conseil d'administration de l'AUPELF-UREF, à l'occasion de l'inauguration du centre SYFED-REFER de Montréal. Le centre héberge le serveur REFER AMERIQUE-CONTACT, qui offre notamment un répertoire de tous les sites universitaires en Amérique du Nord.
Adresse URL:
http://WWW. refer. qc.ca.

M. Camdessus: la mondialisation doit s'accompagner d'un volet social

On trouvera ci-après un résumé de l'allocution prononcée par Michel Camdessus, Directeur général du FMI, au seizième congrès de la Confédération internationale des syndicats libres à Bruxelles, le 26 juin 1996.

Le FMI et le syndicalisme mondial partagent le même objectif: faire reculer chômage et pauvreté et, ce faisant, circonscrire les risques liés à la mondialisation tout en maximisant son potentiel positif.

La mondialisation présente des avantages. Depuis que les obstacles aux échanges s'aplanissent, il est indéniable que les revenus et les niveaux de vie ont augmenté à l'échelle mondiale, ce qui ne signifie pas pour chaque individu. Ce sont les pays qui se sont engagés dans la libération des échanges qui en retirent les plus grands avantages, et le monde entier bénéficie de leurs progrès. Sans la forte croissance d'une quarantaine de pays en développement qui ont accepté la discipline de l'ouverture économique, le monde entier aurait connu une récession généralisée dans les années 1991-93, alors que trois grands pays industrialisés étaient en pleine récession.

L'explosion du commerce a aussi créé des branches d'activités nouvelles et souvent des emplois mieux payés, tandis que l'investissement étranger est devenu un Facteur de plus en plus important de

création d'emplois dans les pays en développement. Or, l'investisseur étranger n'est prêt à s'enfuir que s'il se sent menacé. Il fera souche et développera ses activités dans les pays dont la politique économique est saine et qui sont dotés d'un système juridique bien défini. Ce constat impose donc aux gouvernements de se comporter de façon responsable.

Quant aux aspects négatifs de la mondialisation, ils se résument à deux malédictions jumelles: l'exclusion des individus et la marginalisation des pays. M. Camdessus enumere plusieurs raisons fréquemment invoquées, et souvent erronées, de pauvreté et du chômage mondial et souligne que chacune doit être examinée.

• *Le chômage structurel.* Ce que l'on craint le plus souvent, c'est qu'un marché du travail mondial permette aux travailleurs des. pays en développement dont les salaires sont extrêmement bas de miner les salaires des travailleurs moins qualifiés des pays développés. Cette tendance n'est pas due exclusivement à une mondialisation excessive du commerce, mais aux changements de l'appareil productif tant dans les pays développés que dans les pays en développement. Il est du rôle des syndicats d'aider les travailleurs à acquérir une nouvelle formation et de veiller à ce que les droits acquis sociaux soient honorés et maintenus à un niveau adéquat et à ce que les retraites puissent être transférées.

• *La faible croissance des pays développés.* Rétablir des taux de croissance viables et réduire l'instabilité financière ne peut qu'inciter les entreprises à investir et à embaucher. Une meilleure coopération pour l'élaboration de la politique macro-économique et des réformes structurelles ira aussi dans ce sens.

• *La technologie.* La vitesse à laquelle la technologie progresse crée un sentiment croissant d'insécurité. La société recueille les bienfaits de la technologie. Il lui incombe en contrepartie de faciliter les adaptations requises, en assurant mieux l'éducation et la formation professionnelle, de manière à garantir que chaque travailleur demeure employable.

• *L'ajustement structurel.* Ajustement structurel et mondialisation peuvent être mis au service d'une stratégie qui favorise plus de croissance et d'emplois. L'ajustement a certes un coût social. Mais rien ne cause plus de souffrances que son refus, car il mène, tôt ou tard, à l'effondrement de l'économie ou de la société. Appliqués avec persévérance, les programmes d'ajustement peuvent contribuer à l'amélioration du niveau de vie. Ce résultat n'est cependant pas obtenu de façon automatique et un modèle économique ne peut à lui seul remédier aux maux de nos sociétés: distorsions de plus en plus flagrantes dans la répartition des revenus au détriment des plus pauvres, risque de voir la pauvreté, la corruption et la criminalité gagner du terrain, et menaces qui pèsent sur l'environnement et les identités culturelles. Ce que les modèles économiques ne peuvent produire, c'est aux pouvoirs publics d'y suppléer; et aucun gouvernement n'accomplira cette tâche s'il n'y est pas poussé par l'opinion publique, en particulier par la pression permanente de syndicats robustes dans un dialogue tripartite et dans un contexte de coopération internationale renforcée.

Marché, équité et solidarité

Quelle est la réaction du FMI face à cette panoplie de problèmes? Elle est loin de laisser exclusivement le dernier mot aux marchés. A la "main invisible" dont parlait Adam Smith, il faut ajouter une deuxième main, moins invisible: celle de la justice, garantie par l'Etat. C'est ainsi que doivent être définies les règles qui assurent le fonctionnement fiable et efficace des marchés, notamment celles qui fixent les droits des travailleurs, L'Etat doit mettre en place un appareil judiciaire indépendant et objectif et le cadre macro-économique propre à exploiter au maximum le potentiel de croissance.

Mais il faut aussi l'intervention d'une "troisième main", une main tendue, celle de la solidarité sociale. Chaque pays a le devoir d'encourager le transfert équitable de revenus des riches aux pauvres, de ceux qui sont en bonne santé à ceux que la maladie saisie, de ceux qui ont un emploi à ceux qui n'en ont pas. La solidarité a aussi une dimension internationale, qui s'exprime notamment par la coopération monétaire, l'aide au développement et l'aide aux pays en transition.

Le FMI oeuvre pour que les trois mains travaillent ensemble. Au niveau national, il est conscient du coût social de l'ajustement et travaille avec les autorités afin que soient en place les crédits budgétaires requis pour les transferts sociaux qui protégeront les groupes les plus vulnérables. Au niveau international, et en particulier en Afrique, le FMI élabore er met en place des instruments efficaces en vue de venir en aide aux plus pauvres, par exemple en donnant un caractère permanent au guichet concessionnel qui lui permet d'accorder des prêts à 0,5% (la facilité d'ajustement structurel renforcée) et, en collaboration avec la Banque mondiale, en cherchant le moyen d'alléger la charge de la dette multilatérale. Mais pour que l'aide internationale permette de circonscrire les risques de marginalisation, le FMI a besoin du soutien actif des syndicats libres.

Pour construire une société harmonieuse, il fout mêler dans de bonnes proportions le mécanisme

du marché, le rôle de l'Etat et la solidarité interne et externe. Le meilleur moyen d'établir le bon dosage est le dialogue à trois, qui associe les travailleurs, le patronat et les pouvoirs publics. Cette structure tripartite doit faire face aux nouveaux défis de la mondialisation.

Les marchés sont sans pitié et mettent à rude épreuve ceux qui tardent à s'adapter. Pour le plus grand bien du monde entier, les syndicats peuvent profiter de leur place aux tables de négociation pour aider les travailleurs à s'adapter et pour engager le dialogue avec les employeurs et les pouvoirs publics afin que cous ceux qui se retrouvent sans emploi à cause du changement structurel puissent être aidés à acquérir une nouvelle formation, à trouver un nouvel emploi et à ne pas perdre au passage le bénéfice des droits qu'ils ont acquis.

(FMI Bulletin - 22 juillet *1996)*

New... Créations... Plans... New... Créations... Plans... New...

A new UN institution whose success or failure could be crucial to avoidance of war in the coming decades was inaugurated in Hamburg: an international maritime court which can deliver swift, expert judgments on scores of seabed disputes around the world.

But the tribunal will only be effective if the parries to a complex web of arguments - including at least four explosive rows which have flared recently in the Asia-Pacific region - are prepared to agree in advance to be bound by its judgments.

The 21 judges will have the task of interpreting the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Uncios), an arcane legal document which came into force in 1994 and has been ratified by more than 100 countries.

So far, the convention - which regulates every aspect of ocean management including fisheries, pollution control, seabed mining and shipping lanes - has appeared to trigger more disputes than it has settled.

Uncios entitles coastal states to proclaim a 200 mile economic zone, or a continental shelf - based on geological formations - which may be much larger.

Inhabited Islands are entitled to their own economic zones, and complex issues can arise when an inhabitable island belonging to one country appears to be on the continental shelf of another.

The fact that the ownership of islands provides the key to rich fishing and mineral resources is stoking controversy over some obscure archipelagos in which nobody took much interest until recently.

But there have been loud calls from Asian politicians to sectie the outstanding disputes in accordance with Uncios, and the new court - where proceedings will be much quicker than at the International Court of Justice in the Hague - will at least provide a test of their sincerity.

Britain suffered a diplomatic defeat over the wording of the convention when Ireland insisted that tiny, uninhabitable rocks should be excluded from the provision that allows islands to have their own economic zones.

Britain has had disagreements with Ireland and other countries about the waters around Rockall, a tiny Atlantic Islet. London has yet to accede to Uncios but says it intends to do so.

Perhaps the most explosive maritime dispute in Europe pits Greece against Turkey. The Ankara government has said it will go to war - and it has secured explicit authorization from parliament to do so - if Greece uses the Law of the Sea to extend ¡ts territorial waters from six miles to 12.

Athens has said it has no concrete plans to cake this step but it reserves the legal right to do so.

Greek officials allege that recent Turkish moves to question the status of tiny Aegean Islands - whose ownership had never aroused much interest in the past - are pare of an effort to acquire bargaining chips in che bigger dispute

about territorial waters.

Turkey has rejected the Law of the Sea as an instrument for setting disputes in the Aegean, and it has complained that a 12-mile limit for Greece would turn the sea into a "Greek lake".

So far, Ankara has rejected Greece's suggestion that seabed mining rights - and possibly other issues where Turkey claims the existence of a dispute - should be referred to legal arbitration. But there is one European country for which the establishment of the Hamburg tribunal is unequivocally welcome.

Its location in a $ lOOm building in a historic German port is a diplomatic coup for the Bonn government, as it presses the case for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and a louder voice in world affairs.

(The Financial Times, 18.10.96)

As the five-year anniversary approaches of the launching of "Agenda 21 " by governments in Rio de Janeiro in June, 1992 local communities remain the field of action for the majority of the world's population. Culturally unique responses ace still needed to solve economic, social and environmental problems. Yet, ¡n this age of globalization, the underlying causes of so many of these problems are increasingly beyond the control of local populations. In such a situation, information-sharing and building better ways to communicate are vital.

To help meet this need the Environment Liaison Centre International (ELCI), has announced the launch of a three year information exchange programme for NGOs around the world. Beginning in the countries of Eastern and Southern Africa, the project will assist NGOs to come together at the national level to identify their common information and communication needs, and to lay out strategies for addressing them.

Electronic networks are part of the solution, but in the countries of the south where very few community groups and NGOs even have a computer, ways must be found to build communication links that do not depend on "high-tech" capacity, but yet have access to the information "highway". Therefore the Information Exchange Mechanisms Project helps NGOs to develop an integrated strategy using a variety of media to strengthen their links with each other and at the same time connect into the global communication system. It aims to connect the local to the global and the global to the local.

For many years NGOs have used a variety of means to communicate with each other and deliver messages so their target groups. These include newsletters, video, street theatre, puppets, community radio and use of the public media (print, radio and TV). The Information Exchange Mechanisms Project will develop a "toolkit" of communication mechanisms, including both established and innovative techniques, as a source of ideas to be drawn on by NGOs in developing their national action plans. How to connect these mechanisms to international networking through the "information highway" will be a focus of the project.

For more information on the Information Exchange Mechanisms Project contact Edward Alitsi, Manager, EDIE Unit Environment Liaison Centre International (ELCI)
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(Communiqué)

L'agence européenne d'armement, regroupant l'Allemagne, la France, l'Italie et le Royaume-Uni, est née le 12 novembre 1996, à Strasbourg, sous le nom d'Organisme conjoint de coopération en matière d'armement (OCCAR). Volker Ruehe, Charles Millón, et Benjamino Andreatta, respectivement ministres de la défense d'Allemagne, de France et d'Italie, ainsi que Lord Frederick Howe, vice-ministre britannique de la défense, ont apposé leurs signatures sur les documents créant cette structure qui marque, selon M. Millon, "la volonté des quatre pays de donner la priorité à l'Europe en matière d'armement". L'OCCAR, dont le siège sera à Bonn, gérera une douzaine de programmes d'armements auxquels participent les pays signataires sur une base bilatérale ou multilatérale. Ces programmes représentent, selon Jean-Yves Helmer, délégué général pour l'armement, "plusieurs dizaines de milliards de francs". Parmi les programmes d'OCCAR, dont la majorité sera franco-allemande, figurent l'hélicoptère de combat Tigre, les missiles anti-chars Milan et Hot, le futur véhicule blindé VBCI, le radar Cobra, le drone (un avion de reconnaissance sans pilote) Brevel et les satellites d'observation spatiale Helios II et Horus.

(AFP).

The World Bank's Partnership with Nongovernmental Organizations
The World Bank, 1996,38 pp. *

This publication was prepared by the Participation and NGO Group of the World Bank. It is intended to outline "the ways in which the World Bank and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can work together in partnership." According to the Bank, NGOs' "local knowledge and expertise and their ability to foster and promote people's participation...give(s) them strong comparative advantage and can make them valuable and experienced allies."

NGO involvement in Bank-financed projects goes back to the mid-70s, but it has recently become a major element in the Bank's work, as NGOs have become increasingly important agents in inter-national development. In 1993, according to the World Bank, international NGOs' development assistance programs amounted to $8.5 billion per annum, or 14% of all international development assistance. Within the Bank's own lending programs, NGOs were involved in 40-50% of all projects approved in fiscal years 1994 and 1995.

The World Bank's Partnership with Nongovernmental Organisations describes the World Bank and how it is organized; outlines concrete ways in which the Bank and NGOs can work together; suggests steps NGOs can take to infiliate or strengthen collaboration; and highlights "some of the principal challenges that arise in operational collaboration between the Bank and NGOs, as well as ways in which the Bank is seeking to address these issues."

Among the useful information to be found in Partnership:

- The World Bank defines NGOs as "any group or institution that is independent from government, and that has humanitarian or cooperative, rather than commercial, objectives." The Bank distinguishes between two main groups of NGOs — advocacy NGOS (ANGOs) and operational NGOs (ONGOs) — and works with both, depending on the nature of specific projects. However, the focus of the Bank's interest is in NGOs which "work in the ateas of development, relief or environmental protection, or that represent poor or vulnerable people."
- The Bank's Participation and NGO Group manages an NGO Profile Database which contains information on more than 8,000 NGOs. Information from the NGO Profile Database is available to Bank staff, NGOs, and others upon request to: Mr. Arthur Thomas Systems Manager (NGO Database) Participation and NGO Group Tel: (202) 473-1155 Fax: (202) 522-3237 E-mail: Athomas@wotldbank.otg
- Bank-financed Social Funds (SFs) offer one way for [he Bank and NGOs to work together. SFs generally are set up in individual countries to improve poor people's access to social services, employment opportunities, and income-generating assets. NGOs operating in countries where SFs have been established can submit requests for financing of their projects to the national agency in charge of administering the fund.
- A section of Partnership lists five recommended steps that NGOs interested in working with the Bank should take. The first is to meet with staffin the Bank's field offices, some of which have NGO liaison positions. NGOs planning to visit Washington, DC, should contact: Mr. John D.Clark Senior NGO Specialist Participation and NGO Group The World Bank 1818 H St., NW Washington, DC 20433 Tel: (202) 473-1840 Fax: (202) 522-3237 http://www.worldbank.org/

A beneficial experience ? Business People on Voluntary Management Committees,
by Marsden, Working Paper 17, Centre for Voluntary Organisation, London School of Economics & Political Science, 1996 *

As the voluntary sector adapts to its expanded role charities have come under increasing pressure to behave in a more business-like fashion. As part of this process there have been calls for the recruitment of people with business skills to the management committees of voluntary agencies. And a number of brokerage schemes have been set up to match business people with voluntary committees.

A new report from the LSE's Centre for Voluntary Organisation' suggests, however, that "the exhortation that voluntary sector management committees need to attract people with business skills' is based on misconceived assumptions about what kind of skills voluntary sector management com-

mittees need and why board members from the private sector are volunteering" .

Zoe Marsden's pioneering study focused on management committee members specifically recruited for their business skills' who for the most pact had a professional background in accountancy or law. She found that:

- the specialist skills they possessed were used sporadically by the management committees of voluntary agencies;
- the "most used and useful" skills they brought to the committees were of a more general kind; in essence they had the "ability to take a mature, balanced and slightly dispassionate overview of issues combined with good group and communication skills";
- their motivation for joining committees was no different from that of other committee members: "all the interviewees had private, social conscience reasons for volunteering and the main reward gained was a personal learning experience";
- they did not take part as a means of advancing their careers; and
- they had not expected to use specific professional skills and took care to avoid being cast in the role of "expert"; the one accountant who did find herself putting her expertise to work for the agency was "resentful".

Marsden suggests that the idea that committee members with 'business skills' are different and that they can provide "something of instrumental value" is an inaccurate stereotype that can lead to a serious mismatch of expectations between an organisation and its business people volunteers.

If voluntary organisations do need business skills like planning and budgeting, achieving quality, satisfying customers and measuring performance the targeted recruitment of management committee members may not be an effective way of obtaining them.

On the other hand the study indicates that the most useful committee members are those "who have an ability to take a mature, patient and objective overview and who have good communication and meeting skills".

This has two implications. In the first place, management committee recruitment and placement schemes should target these abilities rather than private sector skills like accountancy and law. And, secondly, since the private sector does not have a monopoly of such people, the schemes should cast their nets more widely than the world of business.

Dimitra guidebook: rural women and development, A directory of European NGOs, research institutes and information centres, King Baudouin Foundation, Brussels, ISBN 2-87212-190-0, 1996.

The King Baudouin Foundation was established in 1976 with the aim of improving che living conditions of the population of Belgium. Over the years, the number of the Foundation's activities abroad has grown and chis trend towards internationalisation will increase in the years to come. Since the Foundation is working with limited means, it concentrates on initiatives with high exemplary impact and "lever function" potential.

Recently, the Foundation has started some initiatives in the Central and Eastern European countries. The aim is to contribute to the promotion of responsible citizenship through direct support to local associations and programmes, conferences, seminars and exchange programmes. Active citizenship is the best guarantee fot a peaceful Europe. The activities are based on a similar programme that the Foundation has been carrying out in Belgium for many years.

Outside Europe the Foundation is present through various international solidarity activities. This solidarity is reflected, amongst other activities, by the King Baudouin International Development Prize which rewards people or organisations who have made a substantial contribution towards the development of the South. The Foundation also supports humanitarian action in Africa and studies related to conflict prevention.

Because of their leading role in the development process, the Foundation is committed to contribute to the enhancement of the quality of life of rural women. Projects in this field include the coordination of the activities of the International Steering Committee on the Economic Advancement of Rural Women, the publication in 199-1 of the report "Susteinable Development: Women and Rural Progress" and, with the financial support of the European Commission, the publication of this Guidebook on European NGOs, research institutes and information centres working in the field of rural

women and development. We hope that this Guidebook will be a useful tool for all development actors.

The King Baudouin Foundation presents the first version of the DIMITRA Guidebook, Rural Women and Development, set up with the financial support of the European Commission. This Guidebook contains a list of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), research institutes and information centres which work with and for rural women in the South.

The DIMITRA Guidebook aims to participate in the genera! effort of awareness raisin and information exchange on che issue of women/gender and development. t is intended for all development actors, particularly women's organisations of the South The Guidebook is unique as its simple format combines a directory and bibliograph with information on the NGO and the research worlds concerned with the enhancement of the living conditions of rural women.

It is certainly timely and helpful to present a directory of European NGOs, research institutes and information centres which support and/or implement projects or programmes concerning rural women in the South. The examples of projects presented in this Guidebook illustrate the trends within development activity which vary greatly from one country to another. In general, one can see that there is a slow transition from women-specific projects to the integration of women in macro-economic circuits (mainstreaming) and the implementation of a gender-based analysis throughout the project cycle.

This work concerns the organisations based in the European Union countries, plus Norway and Switzerland. It does nor claim to be exhaustive, aiming instead to present the trends encountered in the 17 countries examined. The descriptions were drawn up from information provided by the organisations concerned which agreed to reply to our request for information.

The Guidebook provides the following information:

- A list of 255 organisations, divided into three broad categories: NGOs, research institutes and information centres. All these organisations have projects or programmes involving or concerning rural women (be it women-specific or not).
- Information on the way the NGOs and research institutes involve and take women (and men) into account in formulating, carrying out, monitoring and evaluating the project cycle.
- Descriptions of recent projects supported and/or carried out by the organisations their local partners which are of relevance to rural women. For the research institute (training) courses and/or research projects on the theme are described.
- A bibliography on the issue (rural) women and/or the role of women in rural development. It includes the organisations' books, research articles, conference reports, debates, seminars and unpublished "grey" literature. Publications addressir a wider subject than "rural women" but which are nevertheless relevant to the situation of women have also been included.
- A brief description of the general philosophy of the organisation and its activities its country of origin.

Initiating National Desertification Funds. Suggested Guidel ines For NGOs, by Heinz Greijn, published by the Environment Liaison Centre International (ELCI) in collaboration with the UNDP Office to Combat Desertification and Drought (UNSO), 1996.

As part of its efforts to fight dryland degradation, The Environment Liaison Centre International (ELCI) in collaboration with The UNDP Office to Combat Desertification and Drought (UNSO), has published a new book on desertification. The book is based in part on UNSO/UNDP's concept paper " National Desertification Funds in the context of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification." and the report of the African regional workshop on National Desertification Funds(NDFs).

Desertification is an extremely serious problem that threatens the lives and livelihoods of millions of people who live in the drylands. Based on this recognition, the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (CCD) was drawn up by governments to serve as a blue print for countries and their citizens to follow in making concerted efforts to fight dryland degradation. Once the Convention enters into force sometime in 1997, it will become an international legally binding instrument that countries must follow. But the theory will not become practice unless several conditions are first mer. One of these conditions is that governments and donor agencies make enough financial resources available to implement the agreements they have made in the text of the convention. This easy-to-read and colourfully illustrated book povides answers to many questions

relating to NDFs now they are established and what roles NGOs can play. It was officially launched on 9th September 1996 in New York during the 9th INCD conference. It begins by offering a background to CCD and RIOD_ an acronym for Réseau international des ONG sur la desertification, which is an international network of NGOs working to help implement and monitor CCD.

Noting that NDFs are still just a new concept, the author makes an attempt to construct a likely profile of what they might look like and furthermore takes the reader to che text of CCD which provides a strong basis for the establishment of the NDFs.

Using examples from Uganda and elsewhere, the author describes innovative instruments already being used to channel funds to support sustainable development efforts. He projects that NDFs will be a success based on lessons learned from other special purpose funds, in particular the National Environment Funds (NEFs).

NGOs are the most important development agencies which reach out to communities in dry-land areas. NGO participation is therefore crucial. In this book, the author describes the role that NGOs should play in the NDFs. and the actions they need to take in preparation for their role in the NDFs. He provides suggestions On how NGOs can make meaningful contributions to the management of an NDF. The author provides practical guidelines that NGOs can use in establishing NDFs, an organisation structure-that ensures transparency and accountability, and a number of guidelines for funding. He maintains that activities to be funded should be primarily community oriented. He has provided four distinct phases towards the establishment of NDFs.

The author concludes that NDFs will be an innovative and effective way of supporting the fight against desertification. The reader will also find in the conclusion the role of ELCI and UNSO/UNDP in desertification and a list of useful resources and contacts.

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